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THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA: PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND
THE EVALUATION OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE
Dana Carver Boehm∗
Buoyed by advances in forensic science, the number of
postconviction exonerations has significantly risen in the American
criminal justice system over the last twenty years. The ethical obligations
of prosecutors faced with such claims, however, have not kept pace. Most
efforts within district and U.S. attorneys’ offices have been incremental
at best, and even those few prosecutors’ offices with more robust
“conviction integrity units”—units that affirmatively investigate claims
of actual innocence and seek to mitigate the likelihood of wrongful
convictions in the first place—suffer from various structural defects.
Often a prosecutor’s default posture when faced with a claim of actual
innocence is to defend the guilty verdict as quickly and efficiently as
possible.
There is good reason for prosecutors to be skeptical of inmate
innocence claims. Those prisoners who raise postconviction claims of
actual innocence largely lose, and rightfully so; for many, perhaps most,
pursuing habeas relief is a matter of routine that follows the exhaustion
of appeals. But however understandable prosecutors’ skepticism, it
comes at a cost: the actually innocent often are grouped together with
the frivolous filers and face the same mountain of prosecutorial
noncooperation notwithstanding the merits of their claims. This is the
new “prosecutor’s dilemma”: how to honor the commitment to doing
justice by way of postconviction review without wasting precious
resources on frivolous petitions.
This Article provides a framework to assist prosecutors in
separating the actually innocent from the masses of nonmeritorious
postconviction challenges, and in ratcheting down the prosecutorial zeal
reflexively associated with these challenges. The proposed framework,
called “tiered review,” takes a pragmatic approach to postconviction
review, setting up a multistage process by which prosecutors weed out
meritless postconviction petitions early on and then apply increasingly
intensive levels of scrutiny to the claims of innocence. Under tiered
review, a prosecutor’s office investigates a petitioner’s innocence claim
if that person can point to some new evidence (broadly defined) of
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innocence, drops its opposition to the petitioner’s claim should that
investigation demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood of innocence,” and
affirmatively supports the petitioner’s exoneration effort where the
investigation yields “clear and convincing evidence” that the petitioner
was wrongfully convicted. Drawing on extensive interviews with
prosecutors from conviction integrity units in Dallas County, Texas;
Harris County, Texas; New York County, New York; Santa Clara
County, California; and Cook County, Illinois, tiered review illustrates
how changes in office culture and the structure of postconviction review
can mitigate inherent biases that make objective postconviction review
so challenging. And while the proposal discussed below does not
purport, as no proposal can, to eliminate the prosecution of the innocent
entirely or to discover every convicted innocent, it does provide a
feasible mechanism whereby prosecutorial zeal and discretion can be
directed toward the most ethical and professionally responsible ends.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2011, the Virginia Court of Appeals exonerated forty-six-yearold Thomas Haynesworth, formally acknowledging that he had spent twenty-seven
years behind bars for a crime he did not commit. Haynesworth’s release from
prison was not the direct result of exonerating DNA, an eyewitness recantation, an
assertion of a constitutionally deficient trial, or revelations of police or
prosecutorial misconduct. Haynesworth’s pro bono counsel made a compelling
argument for his innocence, 1 but as a minority of the Virginia Court of Appeals
made clear in a vigorous dissent, Haynesworth almost certainly would not have
been found innocent but for the avid support of then-Virginia Attorney General
Ken Cuccinelli, who had affirmatively joined Haynesworth in his petition for a
writ of actual innocence. 2
Like Cuccinelli, prosecutors across the country have the power and influence
to free from prison this country’s convicted innocent. 3 Nevertheless, in the vast
majority of documented exonerations, prosecutors have vigorously opposed the
habeas petitions of the wrongfully convicted—sometimes for decades—before
ultimately agreeing to the prisoners’ release, if they ever agree at all. 4

1

The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project and Hogan Lovells US LLP jointly represented
Haynesworth in his actual innocence petition. The Author, then the lead associate of Hogan
Lovells’ pro bono department, assisted in Haynesworth’s case from 2010 to 2011.
2
Haynesworth v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 817, 818 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (Elder,
J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no direct evidence that exonerates Haynesworth. The Attorney
General has merely expressed his opinion that Haynesworth is innocent.” (emphasis
omitted)).
3
While prosecutors have no statutory authority to order a prisoner’s release, when the
very arm of the state responsible for the initial imprisonment of that individual renounces
its conviction, proclaims that individual’s innocence, and seeks that person’s release, it
stands to reason that courts would not object.
4
See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors have consented to
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Haynesworth is not, unfortunately, unique: a recent survey suggests that since
1989, the United States has seen 873 prisoners exonerated as actually innocent of
the crimes for which they were convicted. 5 Given that the vast majority of these
exonerations are DNA-based, most assume that this number—or any other
wrongful conviction estimate—represents only a fraction of those prisoners
wrongfully incarcerated. 6 If, as is commonly asserted, it is better for some number
of guilty to go free than to convict a single innocent person, 7 there is a clear need
for a mechanism that would help prosecutors distinguish meritorious claims of
innocence from the unmeritorious.
In the face of these conviction errors, it is tempting to blame the prosecutors.
But while a natural prosecutorial zeal for maintaining convictions may play a role
in the reflexive resistance to actual innocence claims, 8 a far more important and
pragmatic reality is at play: prosecutors confront a massive number of
postconviction challenges, the overwhelming majority of which are, in fact,
frivolous. For every Thomas Haynesworth, there are many more Ray Dansbys (a
convict who claimed actual innocence despite the fact that multiple witnesses,
including his son, watched him shoot his ex-wife multiple times at point blank
range) 9 and Edwin Marreros (a convict who, after exhausting his appeals and
habeas remedies, filed a pro se actual innocence claim that made no real argument

DNA tests in less than fifty percent of the cases in which testing later exonerated the
inmate.”).
5
SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 7 (2012), available at http://www.la
w.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf.
The accuracy of exoneration figures is always somewhat controversial, particularly where
non-DNA cases are included. In some respects, the 873 figure is conservative, as it
excludes “group exonerations” that have gained widespread public attention and typically
involve mass police misconduct, such as those seen in Tulia, Texas; Dallas, Texas (the
“Sheetrock Scandal”); and Los Angeles, California (the “Rampart Scandal”). Id. at 3, 80–
90. The Innocence Project also keeps a frequently updated tally of exonerations in which it
is involved, which typically involve DNA, on its website. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); see also Samuel R. Gross et
al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
523, 524 (2005) (noting an earlier tally from the authors of the National Registry of
Exonerations Study); Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1553
nn.15–16 (2008) (discussing the empirical studies related to this topic).
6
GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 3; JIM PETRO & NANCY PETRO, FALSE JUSTICE: 8
MYTHS THAT LEAD TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 97 (2011); Glenn A. Garber & Angharad
Vaughan, Actual-Innocence Policy, Non-DNA Innocence Claims, 239 N.Y.L.J. 1, 3, Apr. 4,
2008, available at http://www.glenngarber.com/common/pdf/GarberActualInnocence.pdf.
7
See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (citing
various authors that have expounded on Blackstone’s original quote).
8
See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004).
9
See Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 2012).
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for innocence but necessitated a response nevertheless). 10 This tension is the new
“prosecutor’s dilemma” 11: how to honor the prosecutor’s commitment to doing
justice by identifying the convicted innocent, without wasting precious resources
on largely frivolous petitions.
This Article prescribes a systematic framework to mitigate the problems
associated with the new prosecutor’s dilemma, a framework that allows
prosecutor’s offices to review actual innocence claims, particularly where DNA
evidence is not available. 12 Using existing conviction integrity units as a case
study, the Article advocates for a postconviction review regime—called “tiered
review”—that is structured to foster innocence seeking, openness, and objectivity
and is guided by concrete standards of review that apply to each case and are to be
applied by each prosecutor. Systematized postconviction review along these lines
not only strikes a good balance between prosecutors’ ethical obligations and
budgetary constraints but also would facilitate consistent review that also is better
suited to prosecutors’ role as ministers of justice.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I.A analyzes prosecutorial
postconviction ethical obligations as presently required by law, specifically
10

See Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2012).
See Russell L. Christopher, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishment,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 107–09 (2003) (referring to the prosecutor’s choice either to
agree not to prosecute a culpable cooperating witness to secure conviction of certain other
guilty defendants or to prosecute the potential cooperating witness and lose the ability to
prosecute other guilty defendants); Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse?
How the Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J.
513, 537 (2012) (describing the “prosecutor’s dilemma” as the difficult choice “to refuse to
prosecute more cases than the system can handle justly . . . or to bring cases without regard
for resources in order to satisfy society’s increasingly punitive appetite”); Amy Ma, Note,
Mitigating the Prosecutors’ Dilemma in Light of Melendez-Diaz: Live Two-Way
Videoconferencing for Analyst Testimony Regarding Chemical Analysis, 11 NEV. L.J. 793,
802–03 (2011) (describing the “prosecutors’ dilemma” as the quandary prosecutors face in
deciding whether to expend the significant resources and logistical challenges inherent in
presenting the live analyst testimony now required in cases requiring scientific analysis, or
simply not to prosecute many of these cases).
12
This Article focuses largely on the efforts of district attorneys’ offices. These
prosecutors are responsible for far more criminal prosecutions than the federal government,
and many operate in states that offer postconviction remedies based on actual innocence
(the Supreme Court has refused to recognize such a claim at the federal level). H. Geoffrey
Moulton, Jr. & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special Prosecutors: An
Organizational Perspective, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 79, 95 (2000). Nevertheless, this
Article purposefully uses the broader term “prosecutors,” because the ethical obligations
that apply to district attorneys apply equally to federal prosecutors, because these
prosecutors encounter the same postconviction challenges (though on a smaller scale,
perhaps, given the lack of a judicial remedy), and because in the District of Columbia
federal prosecutors do engage in the prosecution of nonfederal crimes and are obligated to
respond to claims under the District of Columbia’s actual innocence statute. See Fran
Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial Oversight of the
Executive Branch, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 310 (2010).
11
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analyzing prosecutors’ ethical obligations with regard to their review of actual
innocence claims. The latest iteration of the Model Rules has attempted to provide
some direction to prosecutors who face ethical questions regarding convictions
already obtained, but the majority of states have no ethical guidelines in this
context whatsoever. Part I.B then summarizes the descriptive and prescriptive
scholarship on postconviction ethics. Scholars addressing these questions have
largely analyzed the cognitive biases causing prosecutorial resistance to innocence
claims, as well as the circumstances under which a prosecutor might affirmatively
assist in an inmate’s exoneration efforts. 13 No one, however, has attempted to
develop a decision-making framework for prosecutors’ offices to employ in
responding to claims of actual innocence.
Part II presents five case studies that serve as the partial basis for the tiered
review approach described in Part III. Relying on extensive interviews with
prosecutors in conviction integrity units in Dallas County, Texas; Harris County,
Texas; New York County, New York; Santa Clara County, California; and Cook
County, Illinois, Part II summarizes the lessons to be learned from the practice of
systematized postconviction review.
Part III presents the Article’s main practical and intellectual contributions: (1)
a series of structural changes to the way that postconviction review is conducted,
and (2) the concept of “tiered review,” or the use of a series of concrete standards
to assess and respond to claims of actual innocence. To counterbalance the natural
resistance prosecutors feel toward innocence claims, postconviction review must
be integrated into the office structurally, in three ways: (1) a management-level
prosecutor must direct the review of innocence claims; (2) the review must be
performed by someone other than the original prosecutor; and (3) the office must,
with specific exceptions outlined below, cooperate with inmates by opening case
files and approving requests for DNA testing.
These structural changes, however, are incomplete without the concept of
tiered review. Under tiered review, a prosecutor assesses whether a claim meets a
particular standard of proof before investing further resources in reviewing the
claim. The tiers function as follows: The review of an initial claim of actual
innocence is subject to the office’s usual protocols, as modified by the structural
changes just described. That process will, without more, result in a denial of the
claim. However, when a petitioner presents new evidence that introduces a bona
fide issue as to the petitioner’s innocence, the office will investigate that claim. If
the investigation demonstrates a “reasonable likelihood of innocence,” the office
will drop its opposition to the claim. And finally, in the event that the investigation
yields “clear and convincing evidence” that the petitioner was wrongfully
convicted, the office will affirmatively support exoneration for the petitioner.
Part IV identifies and responds to counterarguments against investing in
postconviction reform, arguing that adoption of the proposed structural changes
13

See, e.g., David Luban, Lecture, The Conscience of a Prosecutor, 45 VAL. U. L.
Rev. 1, 16–17 (2010); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After
Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 175 (2005).
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and tiered review are realistic—and potentially inevitable—prospects for the
majority of prosecutors’ offices. Part IV also shows how postconviction review
may be instrumental in remedying some of the most serious criminal justice issues
for today, including mass incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice
system.
Before proceeding, there are two caveats. First, while tiered review and the
associated structural modifications presented here can be applied broadly by
prosecutors’ offices across the country, the proposals are clearly aspirational in
nature. By proposing a structure that requires significant additional effort and
resources from prosecutors’ offices across the country, the proposal likely will be
subject to criticism for being overly burdensome. At the same time, by attempting
to make the burden of reviewing postconviction actual innocence claims
manageable and practicable for prosecutors, it is likely also to be criticized by
innocence advocates for being underinclusive in terms of its ability to detect the
claims of the convicted innocent. Such is the nature of proposals aimed at
addressing the problem of wrongful conviction. Professor Fred Zacharias, the first
scholar to engage the question of postconviction prosecutorial ethics, observed:
At best, one can only hope to identify considerations, reasons, or ways of
analyzing appropriate conduct by prosecutors. The absence of legal
constraints eliminates the possibility of defining clearly correct, or
incorrect, behavior. Similarly, a consensus regarding particularized ethics
rules is unlikely to develop. In most cases, the conflict between the
presumption of guilt and seemingly “fair” prosecutorial conduct is
strong, thus rendering any resolution debatable. 14
The resolution proposed below is, without question, debatable. The aim of
this Article is not to prescribe a definitive solution, but to advance the current
conversation beyond postconviction prosecutorial ethics and the prosecutor’s role
in restoring justice to the wrongfully convicted to discussion of the specific steps
those prosecutors can and should take in doing so.
Second, some may argue that because the number of convicted innocent is
relatively small, devoting finite resources to the problem of wrongful conviction is
misguided, particularly given the scale of other criminal justice problems like mass
incarceration and racial injustice. But this argument misses the point. There is no
question that mass incarceration is, as William Stuntz called it, “the criminal
justice crisis of our age” 15 and that it disproportionately has impacted the United
States’ minority populations. 16 But these problems are all related. Systematized
14

Zacharias, supra note 13, at 175.
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 246 (2011).
16
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 54–57 (2012); BRUCE
WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3–4 (2006); Ian F. Haney Lopez,
Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2010). As of 2006, black men were six to eight times more likely
to be incarcerated than whites, an incarceration trend that does not appear closely
15
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postconviction review can lead to broader improvements to prosecutorial culture;
reorienting prosecutorial culture to justice seeking through use of a postconviction
review framework can also benefit larger criminal justice problems, including
mass incarceration and racial injustice. Like wrongful conviction, mass
incarceration and racial injustice are tied in part to misused prosecutorial authority.
While postconviction review is not a magic bullet for either mass incarceration or
racial injustice, the improvements to prosecutorial culture that attend that reform
have far-reaching consequences for other problems as well.
I. PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
Prosecutorial ethics have long been a topic of scholarly discussion, but in the
postconviction context, this discussion has resulted in very few concrete legal
rules. Part I.A lays out the law on postconviction ethics, the whole of which
amounts to a model rule that only eight state bars have adopted. 17 Because so few
states have adopted rules on postconviction prosecutorial ethics, most prosecutors
are left to rely on their overinvoked but nebulously defined role as “ministers of
justice,” a role which scholars have in recent years parsed closely in the
postconviction context.
Part I.B outlines the scholarship on prosecutorial postconviction ethical
obligations, which is much more developed than the current law: scholars have
explored the existence of a prosecutorial postconviction ethical obligation, 18
investigated why wrongful convictions occur and how they can be avoided, 19 and
analyzed the specific steps prosecutors should take to remedy existing wrongful

correlated with crime rates. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF
JUSTICE 31 (2009).
17
As of May 2012, the ABA reports that Idaho adopted Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h)
without modification, and Colorado, Delaware, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and
Wisconsin have adopted modified versions of the rule. AM. BAR ASS’N, CPR POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT RULE 3.8(G) AND (H), at 1 (2012) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/3_8_g_h
.authcheckdam.pdf. As of that report, ten jurisdictions were studying the rule to determine
whether adoption would be desirable. Id. (noting Alaska, Arizona, California, the District
of Columbia, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont). In July
2012, New York also adopted Model Rule provisions 3.8(g) and (h) in modified form. See
N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., COURT NOTICES 119 (2012), available at http://www.daasny.or
g/Court%20Notices%20Rule%203.8.pdf.
18
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and PostConviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 481 (2009); Luban, supra
note 13, at 16–17; Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to
the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 55–57 (2009);
Medwed, supra note 8, 132; Zacharias, supra note 13, at 175.
19
See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 165–69 (2011). See generally GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5.
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convictions. 20 This Article is an attempt to bridge these three scholarly efforts by
constructing a concrete postconviction review framework that would satisfy
prosecutors’ postconviction ethical duties in a way that is not only effective in
remedying wrongful convictions but also practical, effective, and capable of
widespread implementation.
A. The Governing Postconviction Ethical Standards
Prosecutors’ ethical obligations are set forth in federal and state statutes and
regulations, the Constitution, case law, and state bar rules of professional
conduct; 21 but virtually none of these bodies of law imposes any postconviction
ethical obligations. The exception to this rule is Model Rule 3.8, provisions (g) and
(h), which, to date, only eight states have adopted. 22 Those provisions are
“standards meant to be the bare minimum, not to establish the full scope of
prosecutors’ responsibility.” 23 For prosecutors in all other states, the only
postconviction ethical direction is the mandate to act as “ministers of justice,” 24 a
vague duty referenced by the Supreme Court and the Model Rules, 25 and one
which essentially results in the matter being entirely subject to prosecutorial
20

See, e.g., CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL LAW’S CONVICTION INTEGRITY
PROJECT, ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS IN PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 4–
5 (2012) [hereinafter INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT] (outlining five specific practices
prosecutors should adopt in order to ensure conviction integrity), available at http://www.l
aw.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Establishing_Conviction_Integrity_Progr
ams_FinalReport_ecm_pro_073583.pdf; Medwed, supra note 8, 169–80; Medwed, supra
note 18, 58–65; Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We
Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
2215, 2238–52 (2010); Mike Ware, Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit and the
Importance of Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1033, 1033–50
(2012) (detailing creation of and specific innocence cases handled by the Dallas County
Conviction Integrity Unit).
21
See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223
(1993) (discussing the adoption of the ABA’s Model Rules and suggesting that the trend
toward specificity in lawyer regulation may go too far).
22
ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at 1; see also David Keenan et al., The Myth of
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 203, 227–28 (2011) (noting earlier data indicating only five states having adopted
Model Rules provisions 3.8(g) and (h)). Unlike most Model Rules amendments, which
originate with the American Bar Association, Model Rules 3.8(g) and (h) was the product
of “reasoned debate” among New York prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges
regarding prosecutors’ ethical obligations upon discovery of new evidence that would call
into question a conviction. Id. at 232.
23
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 472–73.
24
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013).
25
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013).
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discretion. As a result, individual prosecutors typically determine what their
postconviction ethical obligations are on a case-by-case basis, without the
guidelines of a formal ethics rule or, often, clear instruction from their chief
prosecutor. 26
1. The Baseline for Prosecutorial Postconviction Ethical Obligations: Minimalist
Ethical Principles Established by the Model Rules Are a Baseline, Not a Standard
Most state bars have chosen to impose no concrete postconviction obligations
on their prosecutors. 27 Even in those few states whose bars have adopted Model
Rule 3.8(g) and (h), 28 the requirements imposed on prosecutors are fairly minimal.
Indeed, like all formal ethics rules, Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h) set a floor of
conduct, falling below which may result in professional discipline—not an ethical
standard for the virtuous prosecutor to follow.
Model Rule 3.8(g) and (h) states,
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material
evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did
not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the
prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or
authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s
jurisdiction,
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless
a court authorizes delay, and
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable
efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the
defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did
not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence
establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was
convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor
shall seek to remedy the conviction. 29

26

See Michele K. Mulhausen, Comment, A Second Chance at Justice: Why States
Should Adopt ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(g) and (h), 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 309, 309 (2010).
27
See Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics
2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 463–500 (2009).
28
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and
Wisconsin have adopted the rule in some form or another. ABA REPORT, supra note 17, at
1.
29
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g)–(h) (2013).
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Notably, these provisions require no affirmative action on the part of the
prosecutor upon mere receipt of a claim of actual innocence. The provisions do not
apply at all unless the prosecutor already knows exculpatory information, which
must be “new” and create “a reasonable likelihood” that a defendant was
wrongfully convicted. In other words, the prosecutor is under no obligation to
affirmatively consider an inmate’s innocence claim, even where a prosecutor
strongly suspects (but does not “know”) that additional evidence may exist that
would call that person’s conviction into doubt. Nor does it impose an obligation to
engage in good-faith, objective review of postconviction claims, whether in the
habeas or innocence context. Instead, these provisions set a “high threshold” for
prosecutorial postconviction action. 30 But “the disciplinary standard was not
intended to imply that when exculpatory evidence does not achieve that level of
significance, it should be ignored.” 31 Rather, proponents of the rule assumed that
prosecutors would engage in some degree of scrutiny and investigation in order to
explore innocence claims and determine whether the evidence in question was
significant enough to require disclosure under the rule. 32 Thus far, that has not
proven true, either in or out of states that have adopted the Model Rules provisions.
Model Rules provisions 3.8(g) and (h) represent an important step forward in
identifying that the prosecution does have some obligation following conviction
and in setting a baseline standard of proof for prosecutors to follow when they do
encounter potentially exonerating evidence. But they fail to impose any obligation
on prosecutors to actually review the many claims of innocence that cross their
desks or to give those claims anything more than a perfunctory, skeptical review.
Although there are no concrete rules mandating good-faith prosecutorial review of
innocence claims, the obligation of prosecutors to serve as “ministers of justice”
would appear to mandate just that type of review. Indeed, while few concrete rules
govern prosecutors in the postconviction context, their aspirational obligation to
serve justice likely requires more.
2. The Aspirational Role of Prosecutors in Effecting Postconviction Justice
Beyond the Model Rules, the “law” mandating prosecutorial postconviction
conduct is effectively nonexistent. Given the longstanding prosecutorial mandate
to “serve justice,” it would seem that prosecutors are obligated to act more
proactively than the Model Rules suggest where innocence claims are concerned.
But to call the charge to “serve justice” a legal standard to guide prosecutors
reviewing actual innocence claims is to overstate its usefulness. As Professor
David Luban observed, “[T]here is no consensus about what justice is, and we
have every reason to doubt there ever will be.” 33 Indeed, there is no reason to
assume that prosecutors who have fought these petitions through to the bitter end
30

Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 511.
Id.
32
Id. at 511–12.
33
Luban, supra note 13, at 20.
31
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are not motivated by a desire to serve justice. Justice, as a guide for prosecutorial
action, provides no analytical power that can guide a conscientious prosecutor in
the review of claims of actual innocence.
This lack of guidelines is problematic given the incentives prosecutors have to
maintain a conviction regardless of the merits of the innocence claim before them.
While prosecutors generally aspire to seek justice, their default response to
postconviction innocence claims is often characterized by reflexive skepticism and
strenuous resistance, a reflex generated by the importance of conviction statistics
for raises, recognition, and district attorney politics; social pressure from police
officers and other prosecutors; the fact that most such claims are baseless; and the
importance of giving finality to victims and the public. 34 Although the law requires
little of prosecutors following a guilty verdict, the prosecutor’s obligation to ensure
that “guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer” 35 suggests that prosecutors should
play a proactive role in exonerating the convicted innocent.
In other words, prosecutors operate under an ongoing obligation to justice, an
obligation that does not terminate upon receipt of a jury verdict. As stated by the
National District Attorneys Association, “The primary responsibility of
prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished.” 36 Of course, “justice” is a
somewhat imprecise guideline for prosecutorial conduct, and reliance on that term
for day-to-day prosecutorial decision making essentially has left difficult ethical
questions to be decided by individual prosecutors, who are making these decisions
based on their individual moral compasses and the exigencies of limited resources.
Part III of this Article parses what “justice” may require of prosecutors in the
postconviction context.
B. Postconviction Prosecutorial Ethics Scholarship
The role of prosecutors in postconviction relief has been a hot topic in legal
academia since at least 2005, when Professor Zacharias first suggested that
prosecutors’ “minister of justice” role may require them to proactively engage
actual innocence claims even after the rendering of a guilty verdict. The
scholarship largely has followed three paths: (1) an exploration of the existence of

34

See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 475–76; Medwed, supra note 8,
at 134–48.
35
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (specifically referencing the U.S.
Attorney); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 612–13 (1999) (detailing the historical roots of the prosecutor’s
role to “seek justice”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2013) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.
This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that . . . special precautions are
taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”).
36
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1-1.1 (3d
ed. 2009), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%2
0Revised%20Commentary.pdf.
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a prosecutorial postconviction ethical obligation, 37 (2) an investigation of why
wrongful convictions occur and how they can be avoided (an inquiry which
necessarily involves the role prosecutors can play in avoiding and remedying
wrongful convictions), 38 and (3) a discussion and analysis of the specific steps
prosecutors are now or should be taking to remedy existing wrongful
convictions. 39
Following Professor Zacharias’s groundbreaking 2005 article, Professors
Bruce Green, Daniel Medwed, and Ellen Yaroshefsky, among others, began
exploring the contours of a prosecutor’s postconviction ethical responsibilities.40
This scholarship not only makes a strong case for the existence of an affirmative
postconviction ethical obligation but also promotes a view that where claims of
innocence are involved, justice-minded prosecutors should work hand in hand with
defense lawyers and the Innocence Project in objectively assessing those claims. 41
Professor Zacharias identifies a variety of scenarios in which a prosecutor may be
obligated to investigate an innocence claim, 42 Professor Medwed suggests
prosecutors should create internal structures in order to do just that, 43 and
Professors Green and Yaroshefsky articulate the circumstances under which a
prosecutor should actively support an innocence claim, even articulating a specific
standard that prosecutors should employ in doing so. 44 This Article pushes this
scholarship still further, identifying specific practices and standards of review to be
used in efficiently weeding out valid innocence claims from among the frivolous.
Professors Brandon Garrett and Samuel Gross have compiled a number of
surveys that not only attempt to grasp the scope of this country’s wrongful
conviction problem but also to draw conclusions regarding the most prominent

37

See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 41; Luban, supra note 13, at 16–
17; Medwed, supra note 18, at 55–57; Zacharias, supra note 13, at 176.
38
See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 19, at 6–11; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 1–
5.
39
See, e.g., INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT, supra note 20, at 4; Medwed, supra note 8,
at 130–32; Medwed, supra note 18, at 37–38; Scheck, supra note 20, at 216–18; Ware,
supra note 20, at 1049–50.
40
See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Hyland Hunt, The Prosecutor and PostConviction Claims of Innocence: DNA and Beyond, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 771, 771–72
(2010); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 467–73; Medwed, supra note 8, at 130–32;
Medwed, supra note 18, at 37–38.
41
See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 516; Luban, supra note 13, at 16–
17.
42
Zacharias, supra note 13, at 176.
43
Medwed, supra note 18, at 37–38, 58–65 (citing examples of effective prosecutorial
postconviction review, including that by the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit,
United Kingdom Criminal Cases Review Commission, and the North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission).
44
See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 495–508. This Article parses that
standard in Part III.B.
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contributing factors to wrongful conviction. 45 Reviewing the data from these
studies indicates that a high correlation exists between wrongful conviction and
eyewitness identification, unsubstantiated confessions, government informant
testimony, or non-DNA forensic analysis of physical evidence.46 These
conclusions not only allow prosecutors and police to improve preconviction
procedures for bringing charges, but they provide prosecutors flags for wrongful
conviction that prosecutors may rely on as part of their postconviction review
protocol. 47
Finally, a growing number of scholars are applying a pragmatic approach to
prosecutorial postconviction ethics, exploring the specific steps prosecutors are
now or should be taking to remedy existing wrongful convictions. 48 Scholars like
Professor Medwed and Professor Rachel Barkow posit concrete, practical
suggestions for prosecutors’ offices to implement in improving prosecutorial
objectivity, 49 while practitioners like Barry Scheck of the Innocence Project and
Michael Ware (formerly of the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit) discuss in
concrete terms how best to counteract natural prosecutorial inclinations toward
upholding conviction, using specifically Dallas’s Conviction Integrity Unit as an
example of the innovations possible in a prosecutor’s office. 50 Likewise, this
Article draws upon the experiences of Dallas and four other conviction integrity
units to identify innovations in postconviction review that comply with
prosecutors’ postconviction ethical obligations and also are practical and palatable
to prosecutors and, therefore, may be of interest to other prosecutors.
This Article builds on and bridges the important scholarship described above,
making several unique contributions to the literature on the prosecutors’ role in
postconviction review of actual innocence claims. First, as just discussed, this
Article canvasses five functioning conviction integrity units, gathering information
that is, for the most part, not publicly available but that is essential for identifying
feasible ways in which prosecutors can play a role in exonerating the convicted
innocent. Second, this Article distills from the practices of conviction integrity
units principles that encourage objective prosecutorial review and can be broadly
applied in prosecutors’ offices across the country, large or small, cash strapped or
45

See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 6–13; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 40
(highlighting factors associated with exonerations); PETRO & PETRO, supra note 6, at 115.
46
See Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial
Sanctions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2928 (2009).
There is a significant volume of high-quality scholarship exploring the common causes of
wrongful conviction and identifying those listed here as some of the most prevalent causes.
See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 19, at 8–11; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 40. That
discussion is outside the scope of this Article, but in the past five years, there have been
several very interesting statistical analyses done on this topic.
47
See infra Part III.B.
48
See, e.g., Scheck, supra note 20, at 2250–51; Ware, supra note 20, at 1049–50.
49
See Medwed, supra note 8, at 169–181; Medwed, supra note 18, at 58–65;
INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT, supra note 20, at 4–9.
50
Scheck, supra note 20, at 2250; Ware, supra note 20, at 149–50.
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well funded. Third, this Article fills a gap not only in the scholarship but in
prosecutorial practice, by combining these principles with clearly articulated
standards of proof that would assist prosecutors in determining whether additional
action in investigating or responding to an innocence claim is appropriate. This
final innovation is important for a number of reasons: improving consistency in
office responses to innocence claims, assisting prosecutors in fulfilling their duty
to serve justice, and ensuring that office resources are expended under
circumstances the chief prosecutor has determined are appropriate and in a way
that will distinguish valid innocence claims from the significant number of
frivolous ones efficiently.
II. THE PRACTICE OF POSTCONVICTION REVIEW
As mentioned above, this Article is not the first to identify the need to address
postconviction ethics. And indeed, other scholars have relied on innovative efforts
in the Dallas and New York County district attorney’s offices to create a system
for evaluating innocence claims and preventing wrongful conviction. 51 Part II goes
further than these previous efforts, presenting the first in-depth evaluation of five
such efforts—known as “conviction integrity units”—operating throughout the
country. 52 The conviction integrity units reviewed in Part II—Dallas County,
Texas; New York County, New York (“Manhattan”); Harris County, Texas; Santa
Clara County, California; and Cook County, Illinois, based on interviews with the
directors of each unit or other senior prosecutors in the office 53—reveal not only
important basic principles but also notable absences of standardized review within
or among prosecutors’ offices. The lack of clearly articulated standards of proof
that would guide prosecutorial discretion—or a reliance on “gut feeling” for
51

Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 494; Scheck, supra note 20; Ware, supra
note 20, at 1034.
52
Because information on prosecutorial decision making and methodology is,
generally, not publicly available, gathering information regarding postconviction review
regimes is a challenge. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 58 (1998) (noting that public access to
information regarding prosecutorial practices has “not expanded since the 1820s”).
Because the American prosecutor, as Angela Davis has observed, both is “the most
powerful official[] in the criminal justice system” and wields its power with vast,
unreviewable discretion, the dearth of publicly available information on how prosecutors
exercise that discretion is troubling from a constitutional rights and transparency
perspective and from a government efficiency perspective. See ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2009).
53
The information in Part II is a product of interviews with the directors of the Dallas
County, Harris County, and Santa Clara County conviction integrity units. Information
regarding Manhattan’s conviction integrity unit was obtained by interviewing a senior
assistant district attorney in the office (the unit director was on vacation), and information
regarding Cook County’s program was obtained through an interview with Fabio Valentini,
the immediate supervisor of the conviction integrity unit director and the chief of Cook
County’s Criminal Bureau.
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identifying a valid innocence claim—leaves even the efforts of these highly
effective conviction integrity units vulnerable to individual prosecutorial biases
and potential discrimination. Where Part I presents the legal and scholarly efforts
to understand postconviction ethics, Part II provides the practical context gleaned
from the five units highlighted herein. This context makes clear the need for and
benefits of the proposal in Part III.
A. Case Studies in Conviction Integrity Unit Implementation
1. Dallas County District Attorney’s Office
In the wake of a series of embarrassing public exonerations, Dallas County
residents elected Craig Watkins district attorney on a platform of restoring
integrity to the district attorney’s office. 54 Watkins pulled his first assistant, Terri
Moore, from private practice and immediately implemented a new approach to the
problem of wrongful conviction. 55 They studied the county’s wrongful convictions,
reviewing them in the same way that the Federal Aviation Administration
investigates an airplane crash scene, working backward from the wrongful
conviction to see what malfunction in the system caused that result. 56 Watkins also
hired an innocence project attorney to form a “Conviction Integrity Unit,” which
would review postconviction claims of actual innocence, and he assigned the unit
an additional prosecutor, paralegal, and investigator, all of whom would work on
postconviction claims of innocence full time. 57 While many innocence statutes bar
those who have pled guilty, lack new evidence, or are no longer incarcerated from
filing a claim of innocence, 58 Dallas County’s Conviction Integrity Unit decided to
54

For decades before Watkins’s election, the county had been infamously resistant to
innocence claims. See John Buntin, 2008 Public Officials of the Year: Exoneration Man,
Craig Watkins, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/poy/Craig-Watkins.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2014). Despite resistance to DNA testing on the part of Watkins’s
predecessors, by the time Watkins took office as district attorney in 2007, Dallas County
had already seen nine DNA exonerations—more than any other county in the United
States. Ware, supra note 20, at 1035. The county’s tenth, eleventh, and twelfth
exonerations came during Watkins’s first weeks in office. Id. (citations omitted).
55
Ware, supra note 20, at 1039. The Thin Blue Line, a 1988 documentary depicting
the wrongful conviction of Randall Adams who initially received a death sentence, presents
a particularly disturbing account of Dallas County justice under long-time district attorney
Henry Wade. See generally THE THIN BLUE LINE (1988).
56
Ware, supra note 20, at 1039.
57
GARRETT, supra note 19, at 259; Ware, supra note 20, at 1034, 1040–41.
58
Texas has not adopted an actual innocence statute. Rather, the exclusive
postconviction remedy in final felony convictions in Texas courts is through a writ of
habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 11.07, § 5 (West Supp. 2012)
(“After conviction the procedure outlined in this Act shall be exclusive and any other
proceeding shall be void and of no force and effect in discharging the prisoner”). Texas
courts have, however, recognized a freestanding innocence claim through habeas
jurisprudence for inmates who can produce new evidence of innocence. See, e.g., Ex parte
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review all claims of actual innocence, from misdemeanors to major felonies,
regardless of how old the case. 59 Further, the unit would not use as its touchstone
the rather stringent standard applied by Texas courts for determining whether a
petitioner is actually innocent. 60 Indeed, the only real restriction employed by the
office would be a jurisdictional one: the conviction must be a Dallas County
conviction. 61 Announcement of the unit’s creation was greeted by a massive flood
of innocence claims from prisoners across Texas and the country, numbers which
have since tapered off to fifteen to twenty new claims a week. 62
Watkins also decided to reverse the office’s longstanding opposition to DNA
testing, implementing a policy of supporting testing if there was relevant biological
evidence to test and the outcome of that test was potentially dispositive on the
issue of guilt or innocence. 63 In the two years following that policy change, nine
people were exonerated. 64 Although inmates have no right to postconviction
discovery in Texas, as in virtually every state across the country, Dallas County
also adopted an “open file” policy of providing requesting inmates with access to
prosecution files. 65 While the open-file policy is not without some limits (e.g.,
inmates making an Eighth Amendment claim may be asked which particular
portions of the file are relevant to the claim), 66 generally, where allegations like
prosecutorial misconduct are made, the trial file is readily provided to the
requesting party. 67 Early on, Dallas also began a collaborative review of its DNA
case files with the Innocence Project of Texas, in which, upon a showing of a
“plausible claim of innocence,” 68 Dallas would provide the Innocence Project the
prosecution’s entire file, including work product. 69 This practice, among others,
Duke, No. AP-76762, 2012 WL 1059895, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2012)
(unpublished decision). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals first articulated its innocence
standard for noncapital cases in Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996). Under that decision, a petitioner “must show by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable juror would have convicted [the applicant] in light of the new evidence.” Id.
at 212 (Baird, J., concurring). While that standard still holds sway for noncapital cases, the
Texas legislature has altered that standard for capital cases. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN., art. 11.071 (West 2012).
59
See Telephone Interview with Russell Wilson, Conviction Integrity Unit Chief,
Dallas Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Wilson Interview].
60
See id.; see also Ex Parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d at 212.
61
See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
62
Id.
63
Ware, supra note 20, at 1039.
64
PETRO & PETRO, supra note 6, at 208.
65
See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
66
Id.
67
See id. (noting that upon instituting the open-file policy, the office soon discovered
that providing the trial file to every requester was more costly than anticipated).
68
Scheck, supra note 20, at 2250.
69
Id. Scheck also cited the Conviction Integrity Unit’s willingness to investigate leads
proposed by the inmate claiming innocence where the unit is uniquely situated to pursue
those leads; the unit’s willingness to allow the Innocence Project or other inmate lawyers to
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led Barry Scheck, cofounder of the Innocence Project, to actively promote the
Dallas model as “the most prominent and successful model for a Conviction
Integrity Unit.” 70
Just as Watkins began his tenure by reforming and updating office policies on
Brady 71 disclosures, eyewitness identifications, and police lineups, the Conviction
Integrity Unit continued to review closely its exonerations for ways to improve
office procedure. 72 All of the exonerations uncovered to date were obtained under
prior district attorneys, but where the attorneys who prosecuted the cases still work
in the DA office, they are notified of the exoneration and its cause, and if
appropriate, additional steps to reform office procedure may be taken. 73 Moreover,
to ensure unbiased review of an innocence claim, the initial prosecuting attorney
typically plays only a limited role in the postconviction review process.74 Where
the innocence claim alleges a Brady violation, the original prosecutor almost
certainly will receive an inquiry about disclosures; 75 however, if the convicted
individual claims an eyewitness misidentification, the office believes there is little
reason to consult with the original prosecutor. 76
Watkins was well aware that he risked the disfavor of Dallas County’s veteran
prosecutors by instituting a conviction review program. Indeed, “more than 200 of
the 267 attorneys [in the office] had actively campaigned for his opponent” in the
election, believing Watkins lacked sufficient trial experience to be district
attorney. 77 “It’s difficult,” Watkins acknowledged. “I still walk around the office
gently because I know there are a lot of people who still don’t want me here.” 78
Watkins had to work hard to ensure his Conviction Integrity Unit was not
marginalized within the office. Structurally, he ensured the unit was integrated
with the already-existing units that were likely to have overlapping cases and that
these divisions (appellate and writ) would operate under the direction of the head

investigate leads those entities are uniquely situated to pursue; the unit’s ongoing, close
working relationship with the public defender’s office, which includes a willingness to
freely exchange information and to engage in joint investigations; and the unit’s formal
adoption of Model Rule 3.8 as official policy. Id. at 2250–51.
70
Id. at 2250.
71
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
72
See Wilson Interview, supra note 59. The new office policy regarding Brady,
implemented during Watkins’s tenure, specifies that a prosecutor may be fired if the Brady
violation is sufficiently egregious. See id.
73
Id. According to Russell Wilson, no prosecutor currently with the office has had a
wrongful conviction that was the product of prosecutorial misconduct. The majority of
wrongful convictions have been the product of an erroneous eyewitness identification or
similar error, often linked with insufficient prior office protocols, which have since been
revised during Watkins’s tenure. See id.
74
See id.
75
Id.
76
See id.
77
Buntin, supra note 54.
78
Id.
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of the unit. 79 The head of the Conviction Integrity Unit is number three in the
office in terms of authority, reporting directly to the district attorney, and, by virtue
of this seniority, would ensure the office’s exoneration-focused policies would be
implemented actively in all divisions.80
Even more critical to office morale has been the successful discovery and
exoneration of many convicted innocent individuals, validating the work of the
unit and underscoring the reality of the wrongful conviction problem. Dallas
County’s rapid reform of office culture may in part be a function of its initial focus
on DNA cases, where exonerations can be quick, straightforward, and
indisputable. 81 These decisive, conclusive, and unquestionable exonerations
demonstrated clearly the importance of the team’s work to prosecutors in the office
and the importance of having such a unit as part of the office’s core mission. 82
2. Harris County District Attorney’s Office
Pat Lykos, then-district attorney for Harris County, Texas, set up that office’s
Post-Conviction Review Unit in 2009, having run for office on a platform of
reform. 83 Harris County has “a reputation as one of the harshest prosecutorial
jurisdictions in the state,” 84 leading the country in sending defendants to death
row. 85 Indeed, since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976,

79

See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
Id.
81
See id. Henry Wade, Dallas’s district attorney from the 1950s through the 1980s,
made preservation of DNA evidence office policy. As a result, Dallas had a massive cache
of DNA cases to use at the outset of its conviction integrity efforts. See Michael Graczyk,
After Dallas DA’s Death, 19 Convictions Are Undone, USA TODAY (July 29, 2008, 1:54
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-29-2653195694_x.htm.
82
See Wilson Interview, supra note 59 (noting that starting with the DNA cases
“cleared the path” in terms of establishing the necessity of the Conviction Integrity Unit).
83
See Telephone Interview with Baldwin Chin & Alicia O’Neil, Post-Conviction
Review Unit, Harris Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office (July 21, 2012) [hereinafter Chin &
O’Neil Interview]. Lykos’s predecessor, Chuck Rosenthal, resigned in 2008 after having
been caught sending racist and pornographic e-mails from his work account (Rosenthal had
survived a crime lab scandal four years earlier which resulted in nearly four hundred
prisoners being entitled to new DNA testing). Ben Crair, Pat Lykos: Texas’ Capital
Punishment Avenger, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2011/04/04/pat-lykos-texas-capital-punishment-avenger.html.
84
Brandi Grissom, An Interview with Harris County DA Pat Lykos, TEX. TRIB. (Aug.
27, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-news-media/tt-interview/an-interview-with-h
arris-county-da-pat-lykos/.
85
Id. Johnny Holmes was an iconic Texas prosecutor, from his handlebar mustache to
the 111 defendants he sent to death row between 1992 and 2000 alone. See Brandi
Grissom, A Tough Prosecutor Finds His Certitude Shaken by a Prisoner’s Exoneration,
TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.texastribune.org/library/multimedia/john-bradley-t
exas-prosecutor-asserts-change-of-heart/. Nor did Holmes give any breaks to lesser
80
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Harris County—the third largest county in the nation (it includes the city of
Houston) 86—has sent more prisoners to the death chamber than any state in the
country. 87
Lykos is no liberal (she is a self-described “Goldwater-Reagan
Republican”), 88 but nevertheless has instituted dramatic change within the Harris
County District Attorney’s Office. 89 Among these reforms was her institution of a
Post-Conviction Review Unit, which she staffed with two experienced prosecutors
from within the office and an investigator. 90 Lykos explained her decision to
institute the new Unit:
I think every major district attorney’s office needs it. We have 50,000
felony cases a year filed in Harris County on average and over 80,000
misdemeanor cases. You can’t have that volume without errors being
made. . . . Public trust and confidence in the system is everything. If
you’re to have civil order, you have to have the public trust the system.
They have to have confidence that it’s fair, that the law is applied
equally. 91
The Innocence Project of Texas has lauded creation of the new unit, 92 and in
the first three years of its existence, the unit has played a leading role in the
exoneration of three convicted innocents. 93 Since announcing its postconviction
criminals: he once sought a life sentence for a substitute teacher who sold a joint to a
student. Crair, supra note 83.
86
Grissom, supra note 84.
87
Crair, supra note 83.
88
Id.
89
Lykos introduced a series of reforms that angered law enforcement, such as
“extending leniency to first time DWI offenders and people caught with trace amounts of
cocaine.” See Doug Miller, GOP Voters Reject Lykos, Choose Anderson in Harris County
DA Race, KHOU 11 NEWS (May 29, 2012, 11:13 PM), http://www.khou.com/news/politics
/Lykos-loses-to-Anderson-in-GOP-race-for-DA--155569755.html. “During [Lykos’s] first
weeks in office, many longtime prosecutors left the DA’s office,” and “dozens of past and
present prosecutors supported [Anderson, Lykos’s opponent] and showed up at
[Anderson’s] election night victory party.” Id. Her reforms, along with her management
style, ultimately led to her defeat in the May 2012 district attorney primary (her term ended
in December 2012). See id.
90
Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. The prosecutors both had rotated through
multiple divisions in the Harris County District Attorney’s Office and already had
established credibility as prosecutors; neither felt as though they were viewed or treated
any differently (i.e., as office ombudsman) by virtue of their move to the Post-Conviction
Review Unit. Id.
91
Grissom, supra note 84.
92
See Peggy O’Hare, For Inmates, Proving Innocence Remains Uphill Battle, HOUS.
CHRON. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/For-inmates-pro
ving-innocence-remains-uphill-1711959.php.
93
See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.
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review program, Harris County has been besieged by claims of actual innocence,
the vast majority of which are baseless. There have been “[l]ots of frivolous
claims,” Lykos has commented. “But we review everything.” 94 Unlike the
conviction integrity units in other jurisdictions, Harris County limits its review to
cases with the potential to yield definitive forensic confirmation of innocence. 95
Harris County’s Post-Conviction Review Unit is tasked with responding to letters
claiming actual innocence plus all requests for postconviction DNA. 96
Harris County’s policy on postconviction file sharing also differs from Dallas
County’s. Unlike Dallas, Harris County does not open its files to unrepresented
inmates. 97 But once an inmate has been appointed an attorney (which happens in
all DNA testing requests that qualify under the postconviction DNA testing statute
and many innocence claims with a forensic component), the office will permit the
attorney to see the parts of the file relevant to the requested DNA or forensic
testing. 98 Like with the other conviction integrity units, guilty pleas, expiration of
statutes of limitation, misdemeanor offenses, or lack of a judicial remedy are not
considered bars to review. 99 If an exoneration would require the unit to make a
credibility determination (such as in a case of witness recantation), however, the
investigation ends there: the office views this type of determination as within the
province of a jury and therefore outside the purview of prosecutorial review. 100 In
the unit’s view, the proper venue for those cases is the court system, where a judge
can make the required credibility determination.101 Of course, the initial innocence
claim itself often does not provide sufficient information to determine whether
conclusive, objective exonerating forensic evidence exists or whether reliance on a
credibility determination ultimately would be required. Therefore, the unit may
still review a claim that lacks an express tie to forensics in an initial claim.
The Post-Conviction Review Unit has instituted several structural protections
to preserve its independent judgment. As in Dallas, the unit reports directly to the
district attorney and her first assistant, and is only accountable to them. 102 Second,
for those cases in which investigation is warranted, the unit avoids discussing the
investigation with the original prosecutor of the case until the investigation
(including witness interviews and forensic testing) is complete and the unit has
made its own preliminary assessment. 103 For those cases that appear to be headed
in the general direction of a new trial or exoneration, however, the office views
94
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The Post-Conviction Review Unit is responsible for responding to requests for
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See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.
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See id; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64 (West 2003).
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consultation with the original prosecutor as an essential part of the process, as the
prosecutor may have information not reflected in the paper files. And if the case is
headed toward exoneration, consulting with the prosecutor is the best way to
confirm the unit’s investigation has been thorough. 104 Equally importantly,
including the prosecutor in the conversation helps ensure the unit does not come to
be viewed as the office auditor, indiscriminately searching for the arguably
innocent. 105
3. New York County (Manhattan) District Attorney’s Office
When Cyrus R. Vance Jr. assumed his post as Manhattan district attorney in
January 2010, he replaced Robert Morgenthau, who had served as the Manhattan
district attorney for thirty-five years and established what many considered “the
country’s premier prosecutorial office.” 106 Vance began his legal career in the
Manhattan district attorney’s office in the 1980s, and even then the office had a
unique culture that favored exoneration. 107 When Vance came to office, he built on
this tradition, initiating a Conviction Integrity Program with a two-fold purpose of
preventing wrongful convictions on the front end of the criminal justice process
and addressing claims of actual innocence on the back end. 108
Vance set up Manhattan’s Conviction Integrity Program in March 2010, a
program with three main components: a Conviction Integrity Committee, a
conviction integrity chief, and an outside Conviction Integrity Policy Advisory
Panel. 109 The committee, comprised of ten senior members of the district
104
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See id.
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Press Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Robert M. Morgenthau Receives New York
State Bar Association’s 2011 Gold Medal (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.nysba.or
g/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=6708.
107
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney, Conviction Integrity Conference
Speech, New York University (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://manhattanda.org/convictio
n-integrity-conference-speech (referencing how each new attorney was told about the
Wylie-Hoffert murder case, in which the district attorney developed doubts about a detailed
confession to a brutal murder and spearheaded a far-reaching reinvestigation which
ultimately led to the suspect’s exoneration).
108
Id. Because this Article is directed at postconviction review efforts, it focuses its
analysis on what the Manhattan district attorney’s office calls the “back end” of its
Conviction Integrity Program.
109
The Advisory Panel consists of leading criminal justice experts, including legal
scholars like Bruce Green and Rachel Barkow, former prosecutors, and Innocence Project
Co-Founder Barry Scheck, who together advise the office on national best practices and
evolving issues in the area of wrongful convictions. Wrongful Conviction, N.Y. CNTY.
DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://www.manhattanda.org/wrongful-conviction (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014); Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, N.Y.C. DA Vance
Announces Conviction Integrity Program (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter N.Y. Cnty. ADA
Press Release], available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
a.dgerEtktWA.
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attorney’s staff, focuses on the front end of the process, reviewing and revising
practices and policies related to training, case assessment, investigation, and
disclosure obligations, with a particular eye for the most common errors leading to
wrongful conviction, such as eyewitness misidentification and false confessions. 110
While Manhattan has long required its prosecutors to comply with rigorous
checklists to ensure justice on the front end of the criminal justice process, and had
long required its prosecutors to be convinced of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”
prior to proceeding with a prosecution, the committee, upon its inception, engaged
in further development of these checklists to specifically address the problem of
wrongful conviction. 111 These detailed checklists have two virtues for prosecutors:
helping to ensure the defendant in the case is the actual perpetrator and assisting
prosecutors in making a stronger case against the actual perpetrator.112 For
instance, because eyewitness misidentification is a common contributor to
wrongful conviction, 113 in cases involving only one eyewitness, Manhattan
prosecutors use an office-created checklist on the types of corroborative evidence
for which they should look. These checklists both bolster cases and serve as a
reminder that extra care is required in that particular type of case to avoid wrongful
conviction. 114 Likewise, the committee updated the office’s checklists for Bradydisclosure obligations, reminding prosecutors of what types of material they should
be looking for and specific places where they should be looking. 115 For all of these
materials, the committee relied on the latest research put together by cognitive
scientists and other empirical analysis done by its Advisory Panel members. 116
These advisors also play an ongoing, albeit largely intermittent, advisory role for
Manhattan’s Conviction Integrity Program, where the conviction integrity chief
seeks their advice on an ad hoc basis as specific issues arise that are relevant to
their expertise. 117
As another component of this front-end process, Manhattan revised its
training regime to incorporate best practices for avoiding wrongful convictions,
adding a “conviction integrity” component to each of its major training sessions. 118
New Manhattan prosecutors are trained on how to recognize the warning signs of a
wrongful conviction, 119 using real cases in which the office discovered a wrongful
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mitigate the occurrence of wrongful conviction).
111

636

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

conviction as models. 120 The office intentionally selected innocence cases in which
very senior, and very well respected, assistant district attorneys in the office had
been fully convinced that they had the right person, only to later discover they
were wrong. 121 By using these types of cases for training purposes, not only are
prosecutors made more attuned to and aware of warning signs, but the realization
that senior, well-respected prosecutors could have made this mistake increases the
focus of young prosecutors on avoiding the error, underscores the message that it
could happen to anyone, and removes in part the stigma of a discovery of this kind
of error, thereby improving objectivity for the postconviction review process. 122
For his conviction integrity chief, Vance tapped a senior assistant district
attorney, Bonnie Sard, who had been at the Manhattan district attorney’s office
since 1994 and was highly respected within the office.123 In her capacity as
conviction integrity chief, Sard coordinates the committee’s activities and leads
reinvestigation of any case that appears to present a meaningful claim of actual
innocence. 124 Like Dallas, Manhattan has no real limitations on the types of claims
it will review; it simply asks applicants to specify what evidence they have of
innocence and how the district attorney’s office would be able to look further into
that evidence. 125 The office does not necessarily consider a guilty plea as a bar to
review, so long as there is a plausible explanation of why the defendant pled
guilty; but it does view the existence of a guilty plea as an important factor to
consider when evaluating a claim of actual innocence. 126 Likewise, Manhattan
does not use the legal parameters of the state innocence statute (which authorizes a
motion to vacate a conviction on the basis of new evidence) 127 to set the
parameters of the unit’s initial review because, as one assistant observed, it is
“hard to know on the front end [of an investigation] where you’ll be on the back
end.” 128 In other words, while new evidence may be a statutory requirement, its
lack does not bar review of the innocence claim by the Manhattan office, as
exonerating new evidence often may be uncovered over the course of an
investigation.
Postconviction claims of actual innocence go directly to the Conviction
Integrity Program, where they are logged, tracked, and receive an initial review by
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Bonnie Sard. 129 Unlike in Dallas, however, in Manhattan, the prosecutor who
originally tried the case does play a role in the review process. 130 In most instances,
Sard consults with the prosecuting attorney as part of her initial review of the case
and, if she is convinced that there has been no miscarriage of justice, she forwards
that conclusion directly to the district attorney. 131 Also unlike the Dallas conviction
integrity regime, in Manhattan, the assistant district attorneys who conduct any
required reinvestigation into a claim of innocence are not devoted full time to the
conviction integrity team. Rather, if Sard determines further investigation of a
claim is needed, she forwards the claim to an assistant district attorney, who will
manage the reinvestigation of the case along with the rest of her caseload. 132 That
assistant district attorney will then report her conclusions back to Sard, who
determines whether additional review is necessary; Sard then reports the decision
to the district attorney. 133 In cases where a full-scale investigation is conducted,
which often takes from six to twelve months, the Conviction Integrity Committee
will meet and review the assistant’s findings upon conclusion of the investigation,
often for several hours. 134 In those instances, where an inmate is represented by
counsel, that lawyer will be invited to attend the meeting and make a
recommendation to the district attorney as to how the office should proceed. 135
Like Dallas County, Manhattan does not employ a concrete standard in
determining guilt or innocence, as Vance explained:
I do not pretend that we have devised a simple formula in this regard. I
will say this: if in reviewing a case, we are looking at the same evidence
the jury saw, and if the trial seems to us to have been conducted in a fair
and competent manner, we would be strongly disinclined to vacate a jury
verdict of guilty—even if we feel, in hindsight, that we might have
reached a different verdict. But on the other hand, if we now have
evidence the jury did not know, or if there was some procedural defect in
the trial that prevented the jury from evaluating the evidence fairly, then
we would be more inclined to substitute our view of the case for that of
the trial jury. But in each instance, the question is the same, and remains
central: do we believe, or at least strongly suspect, that the defendant is
actually innocent? 136
In the year and a half since the program began, Manhattan has vacated one
conviction (the case awaits retrial) and confirmed through investigation that two
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other convictions were valid. 137 Although Vance acknowledges that the program is
still a work in progress, he also has described the results of his Conviction Integrity
Program as “unequivocal”: “the system we have devised works.” 138
4. Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office
In 2011, the newly elected district attorney in Santa Clara County, California
Jeffrey Rosen, established a Conviction Integrity Unit for his district.139 Like
Dallas, Santa Clara had encountered its fair share of bad press in the lead up to
creation of the unit, including a series of misconduct allegations against
prosecutors in the office 140 and the suspension of one such prosecutor by the
California State Bar Association. 141 Like Lykos and Watkins, Rosen ran on a
137

See id.
Id.
139
See Interview by David Onek with Jeffrey Rosen, Santa Clara Cnty. Dist.
Attorney, The Criminal Justice Conversations Podcast with David Onek, Episode #24
(May 23, 2011) [hereinafter Rosen Interview], available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/fil
es/CrimJusPod_Episode24v2.pdf.
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Sue Dremann, DA Officially Creates Conviction-Integrity Unit, PALO ALTO
ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2011, 3:17 PM) http://paloaltoonline.com/news/show_story.php?id=204
27. The sanctioning of this Santa Clara prosecutor by the California State Bar is notable in
part because of the extreme rarity of prosecutorial sanctioning. Between 1970 and 2009,
only forty-four cases had been brought in which prosecutors faced disciplinary proceedings
for misconduct relating to defendants’ constitutional rights. DAVIS, supra note 52, at 128–
29. This was even true in cases where appellate courts, in reversing a conviction due to
Brady violations or prosecutors knowingly allowing lying witnesses to testify, described
the prosecutors’ behavior as “unforgivable,” “intolerable,” “beyond reprehension,” and
“illegal, improper and dishonest.” Id. at 135–36. Indeed, not only were these prosecutors
not sanctioned by their respective bars, their offices largely chose not to discipline them
either. Id. at 136–38; see also MEDWED, supra note 119, at 29–31 (arguing that current
prosecutorial discipline is ineffective); Scheck, supra note 20, at 2222 (noting the lack of
interoffice sanctions and arguing in favor of interoffice sanctions in light of the
ineffectiveness of state bar and judicial remedies).
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In a rare instance of a state bar sanctioning an active prosecutor, in May 2012, the
California State Bar charged Santa Clara Deputy District Attorney Troy Benson with five
counts of misconduct, including suppressing evidence and then lying to conceal having
done so. The charges stemmed from a 2006 child molestation case in which Benson
allegedly failed to turn over a videotape that cast doubt on whether the victim was, in fact,
abused, and then denied concealing the evidence, including while under oath in court. The
defendant in the case served four years in prison before his conviction was overturned on
the basis of Benson’s conduct (conduct expressly condemned by the appellate court). The
discovery of the suppressed videotape led to the discovery of thousands of other such
undisclosed tapes, forcing prosecutors and public defenders to reexamine hundreds of
molestation cases. Tracey Kaplan, State Bar Charges Santa Clara County Prosecutor with
Misconduct; Disbarment Possible, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 17, 2012, 11:43:01
AM) http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_20646441/state-bar-charges-santa-clar
a-county-prosecutor-misconduct.
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platform of renewing ethical integrity, promising to raise the District Attorney’s
Office’s ethical standards and to restore integrity and public trust in the office. 142
During his campaign, Rosen pledged to improve training for prosecutors and to
review any cases alleging misconduct or miscarriages of justice.143 His victory
over incumbent Dolores Carr was the first time in more than eighty years that an
incumbent district attorney had failed to win reelection in Santa Clara County. 144
Rosen tapped David Angel, an experienced prosecutor known as a reformer in
the office, to be his first Conviction Integrity Unit director. 145 Along with Angel,
the office assigned a special assistant district attorney and a full-time investigator
to the unit. Not only had Angel reformed the county’s eyewitness protocol and
pushed for the recording of suspect interviews in cases involving violent crime, but
he also participated in an internal office investigation that resulted in the
exoneration of a man wrongfully convicted and sentenced to life in prison. 146 In
addition to his years of experience as a prosecutor, Angel also teaches a seminar on
righting wrongful convictions at Santa Clara Law School with Northern California
Innocence Project Executive Director Cookie Ridolfi. Angel is also well regarded
by both prosecutors and defense lawyers,147 a valuable asset given that, like
Manhattan and Dallas, Santa Clara often collaborates with the Innocence Project
on postconviction innocence cases. 148
Like Manhattan, Santa Clara’s program involves prominent front- and backend components. On the front end, the office strengthened its training for
prosecutors and police officers on ethics, discovery obligations, and the warning
signs of wrongful convictions, often drawing upon old cases of official misconduct
and wrongful convictions from the office to instruct on how to avoid these
problems. 149 Rosen also changed the office’s policy on Brady disclosures. Under
142
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California law, prosecutors must turn over the evidence at least thirty days before
trial, but Rosen initiated a new policy under which his prosecutors would disclose
information even earlier (“as soon as feasible”). 150 To facilitate both pretrial
discovery and posttrial review, Santa Clara also began streamlining its discovery
process by relying more heavily on web-based software and digital evidence
storage, 151 and it invited public defenders and private criminal defense attorneys to
provide input on other potential ways to improve discovery. 152 Rosen also has
taken a hard line among his assistants on complying with discovery obligations: in
2011, the press covered a story in which Rosen pulled a prosecutor off a highprofile gang case because the prosecutor failed to provide timely discovery. 153
Santa Clara’s Conviction Integrity Unit focuses its efforts on postconviction
claims of actual innocence, 154 but under some circumstances it will even review
alleged sentencing injustices. 155 While Santa Clara does not limit the claims it
reviews to the legal requirements of the California innocence law, 156 it does
generally require either a showing of some new evidence that was not presented to
the jury or a very credible allegation of some sort of official misconduct. 157 Of
course, where credible, respected defense attorneys have raised concerns about the
conviction of their clients, the office has investigated those cases as well. 158
Indeed, Santa Clara has participated in two exonerations in cases in which there
was no new evidence or allegations of misconduct but where a seasoned defense
attorney expressed deep concerns that a wrongful conviction had occurred.159
Rosen changed office policy on DNA testing and postconviction discovery as
well. While California’s DNA testing statute is fairly defendant friendly, 160 Santa
Clara adopted an even less demanding standard for DNA requests, permitting
150
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testing upon any request, so long as the inmate is willing to pay for it. 161 The office
also has an open-file policy, which Angel has said actually serves as a good first
filter for the postconviction review process, allowing the prosecutor to confirm that
the file is complete and that all appropriate information was turned over initially. 162
And, of course, the office’s new digitalization of its case file system makes its
open-file policy less costly and time consuming than it would be otherwise, and it
generally ensures a more complete file. 163
Like Manhattan, Santa Clara has taken a middle-of-the-road position with
regard to the original prosecutor’s involvement in the postconviction review
process. As Angel explained, it is essential that the trial attorney not be in charge
of the review in order to preserve the independence of the evaluation (a policy
which, he notes, benefits the original prosecutor—ensuring credibility for the
finding that no prosecutorial error occurred). 164 On the other hand, if the reviewing
attorney does not consult with the original prosecutor at all, the Conviction
Integrity Unit may appear to be searching for prosecutorial error and come to be
viewed by line attorneys as a watchdog, rather than as a prosecutorial failsafe. 165
For those reasons, when Angel or one of his assistant district attorneys conducts
the initial review, pulls the file, and decides further investigation is warranted, the
original prosecutor receives a courtesy call or e-mail explaining that a review is
underway and soliciting any information the original prosecutor might consider
helpful. 166 Most often, the original prosecutor does not have information to share,
but in a minority of cases, the prosecutor does weigh in, and her views, dismissive
or affirming, are taken into consideration. 167
Santa Clara has structured the unit to maximize its independence and
objectivity. Angel is part of the office’s executive management and reports directly
to Rosen. 168 He participates in the weekly executive meetings in which the most
pressing current issues and office priorities are discussed and through which the
moral tone of the office is set. 169 As Angel explained, having the Conviction
Integrity Unit as a central part of the process is crucial to its success and credibility
within the office so that it is not viewed as an adversarial side entity, but instead as
central to the mission of the office. 170 The centrality of Santa Clara’s Conviction
Integrity Unit is also ensured by the office hierarchy: Angel oversees the office’s
appellate division, its crime lab, and its training program. 171 By virtue of his
161
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oversight over these divisions, Angel is able to ensure that avoiding and remedying
wrongful convictions is a central part of Santa Clara’s core mission. Indeed,
Angel’s authority over the appellate unit is important to setting the appropriate
standard for prosecutorial conduct. When appellate prosecutors are narrowly
focused on maintaining convictions, they may defend on appeal questionable
ethical behavior on behalf of the original prosecutor simply because a
constitutional justification for doing so exists. 172 This is true even where justice
may be better served by repudiating such behavior and even allowing the
conviction to be reversed. 173 The Conviction Integrity Unit has the authority,
however, to change the way these cases are argued and to send the message to
prosecutors, courts, and the public that, as Angel explained, “the standard in our
office is not the constitutional minimum.” 174
5. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office
In February 2012, Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez announced
her office’s creation of a Conviction Integrity Unit 175 and that the office already
was looking into thirty-five cases in which defendants claimed innocence. 176 Both
during and before Alvarez’s tenure, Cook County has had a long-term problem
with wrongful conviction. Alvarez has come under heavy criticism from the
Innocence Project for her handling of the wrongful convictions of young black
men, specifically the cases of the Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four, cases which
involved exonerating DNA. 177 Although Alvarez has come under fire herself in
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Interview with Fabio Valentini, Chief of Criminal Bureau, Cook Cnty. State’s Attorney’s
Office (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter Valentini Interview].
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evidence that indicated none of them participated in the crime. Id. Similarly, the
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recent years, 178 Cook County’s wrongful conviction problem predates her time in
office. According to the National Registry of Exonerations, a joint project by the
University of Michigan and Northwestern University law schools, Illinois—and
Cook County specifically—leads the country in wrongful convictions since
1989. 179
Cook County’s Conviction Integrity Unit has four attorneys dedicated to
reviewing postconviction claims on a full-time basis: the deputy supervisor in the
Special Litigation Unit and three other experienced attorneys. 180 In addition, the
unit has two full-time investigators and a victim and witness specialist.181 The unit
is under the umbrella of Cook County’s Criminal Bureau and its Special Litigation
Division, along with Cook County’s Post-Conviction Unit, which reviews and
responds to habeas cases. Like Dallas and Manhattan, Cook County does not
restrict its review to claims cognizable in court—it will review a claim of actual
innocence whether or not it complies with statutory or precedential requirements
for an innocence claim. 182 Indeed, Cook County may proceed with postconviction
review even while a judge is still deciding whether an inmate’s actual innocence
claim should move forward. 183 Unlike Dallas, Cook County did not obtain
additional funding or grant money to set up its Conviction Integrity Unit, choosing
instead to divert resources from other office programs in favor of its postconviction
review program. 184
In the wake of announcing the unit’s creation, Cook County received a tidal
wave of claims of actual innocence, which only began slowing months later. 185 At
present, it is prioritizing the most serious claims of actual innocence, like murders
confessing to the 1994 rape and murder of a prostitute, also despite police and prosecutorial
access to exonerating DNA. Id.
178
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the right to assert a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence. Id.
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Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
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See id.
185
See id.
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and rapes, and cases where individuals are still incarcerated. 186 Cases bearing the
standard indicia of a wrongful conviction case (cases involving only one
eyewitness, a confession with little supporting evidence, or a confession case
involving a juvenile or low IQ individual) receive special attention. 187 While a
guilty plea is not a bar to review, it is a factor the unit considers when weighing the
merits of the claim and determining where it falls in terms of priority of review.188
The office does not have a formal open-file discovery policy or a blanket policy of
consenting to DNA cases, but, according to the office, it does, for the most part,
comply with discovery requests and only rarely objects to requests for DNA
testing. 189
Decisions regarding whether innocence claims should be investigated are
made using the experienced judgment of the prosecutors responsible for the unit—
both the Criminal Bureau chief and the supervisor of the Conviction Integrity
Unit. 190 In the vast majority of cases, the initial reviewer pulls the case file and
relevant transcripts in order to assess the credibility of the actual innocence claim,
with the exception to this practice occurring where the initial letter contains so
much information that reviewing the file is unnecessary. 191 If further investigation
is needed, the unit supervisor most often assigns the case to one of the unit’s
assistant district attorneys but occasionally handles the investigation herself. 192
Reinvestigations are conducted much like initial investigations, though with the
passage of ten, twenty, or thirty years, the investigation is far more difficult. The
reviewing prosecutor looks for the same things she would have in a preconviction
review of the case: consistency or inconsistency in witness accounts, whether the
offender’s account is credible and genuine, and whether there is physical evidence
(DNA or otherwise) that was not tested contemporaneously but that might have
become testable since or requires retesting. 193 Just as with the initial charging
decision, the prosecutor is instructed to review the case with no presumption of the
suspect’s guilt, but she does weigh to some degree the fact that the individual has
been convicted by a jury, has had a trial judge likely reject a motion for new trial,
and generally has had the verdict upheld on appeal and in the postconviction
context. 194
The office has no standard or scientific formula for determining when and
whether an inmate has demonstrated her innocence.195 Rather, the unit relies on the
186

See id.
Wildeboer, supra note 175; see also Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
188
See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
189
See id. In Harris County, for instance, prosecutors deny requests for DNA testing
where the DNA testing requested would not provide definitive proof of guilt or innocence
in any event. See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.
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See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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expertise of the prosecutors reviewing the case as individuals who have tried a
large number of cases and developed instincts through their experience as to what
evidence is good or bad. 196 Where the unit determines that there was not sufficient
evidence to prosecute an inmate, the office may nolle pros the case or not oppose a
postconviction claim of innocence. 197 Where there are lingering questions
internally about whether the person is actually guilty, regardless of whether the
case is in a preconviction stage or a postconviction stage, Cook County’s policy is
to dismiss the case and not prosecute it again. 198
B. What These Units Indicate and What They Are Missing
The conviction integrity units in all five of these jurisdictions represent a
significant and impressive investment of time, energy, funds, and experience by
very busy prosecutors with finite resources. Through this dedication of intellectual
and financial resources, and now through the years of experience these offices
have gained through conducting postconviction review, several overarching,
essential components of postconviction review are apparent, including the
importance of encouraging innocence seeking, openness, and objectivity. Each of
the conviction integrity units reviewed above, and particularly Dallas and Santa
Clara, have structured their units in an attempt to make conviction integrity, or
innocence seeking, part of the office culture. For example, in Santa Clara County,
the conviction integrity unit director also oversees the office’s appellate division,
and by refusing to defend constitutionally questionable changes on the appellate
side, he has changed the office’s preconviction practices, requiring the office to
operate well above the constitutionally required standards of conduct. 199 All
conviction integrity units but Harris County and Cook County have embraced
open-file discovery and open-DNA-testing policies, and all carefully circumscribe
the role of the original prosecutor in reviewing innocence claims. The efforts of
these conviction integrity units demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of
these policies, and all of these policies taken together form a postconviction review
structure that is capable of widespread implementation by prosecutors’ offices
across the country.
While Dallas County was able to secure additional funding specifically aimed
at implementing a conviction integrity unit, the majority of these units represent a
significant expenditure and a shifting of resources away from other office
priorities. But postconviction review need not be this expensive. As detailed below
in Part III, postconviction review does not require a freestanding conviction
integrity unit: applying the three essential principles above can assist any office in
improving its ability to identify the wrongfully convicted, whether the office has
prosecutors dedicated full time to this kind of review or not.
196

See id.
See id.
198
See id.
199
Angel Interview, supra note 146.
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III. RESOLVING THE PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA: STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS
AND TIERED REVIEW
The efforts of the five studied district attorneys’ offices provide important
insights for effective postconviction review, but even among these highly effective
units, there is room for improvement. Part III proposes to resolve remaining
structural weaknesses in a way that will be tractable in other district attorneys’
offices. Part III.A draws together the most useful aspects of these units and uses
them to outline three broadly applicable structural modifications for prosecutorial
postconviction review: (1) a management-level prosecutor must direct the review
of innocence claims; (2) the review must be performed by someone other than the
original prosecutor; and (3) the office must, with specific exceptions outlined
below, cooperate with inmates by opening case files and approving requests for
DNA testing.
Part III.B then supplies what the established structure of each conviction
integrity unit lacks: legal and ethical principles that can guide that postconviction
review process. As explained in the introduction, “tiered review” functions guide
the posture that prosecutors adopt in the face of claims of actual innocence. The
concept of tiered review encompasses three components: (1) a prosecutorial
investigation where a bona fide issue exists as to the petitioner’s innocence, (2)
dropping of prosecutorial opposition to an innocence claim where the investigation
demonstrates a “reasonable likelihood of innocence,” and (3) affirmative support
for exoneration in the event that the investigation yields “clear and convincing
evidence” that the petitioner was wrongfully convicted.
Taken together, these two pieces represent a complete review framework:
first, a postconviction review structure designed to efficiently manage inherent
prosecutorial biases, and second, a postconviction review process that operates
within that structure using clear standards of review on which prosecutors can rely
to determine what action is appropriate and when with regard to an innocence
claim. Although in a resource-abundant world, prosecutors’ offices across the
country could each have a “Conviction Integrity Unit” devoted exclusively to
postconviction review of innocence claims, in the vast majority of prosecutors’
offices, the resources to dedicate prosecutors full time to that effort are simply
missing. 200 While the framework set forth below is based on lessons learned from
conviction integrity units, it could just as easily be used by an appellate division,
postconviction writ division, or individual prosecutors who encounter claims of
actual innocence.
The most important characteristic of this type of postconviction review is the
standardization itself—that a fairly detailed protocol, with a clearly assigned
200

Indeed, for offices in less populous cities that receive far fewer innocence claims,
it would be a waste of money and effort to do so. Of the approximately 2,500 district
attorney offices across the United States, 85% are operated by four lawyers or fewer. See
Telephone Interview with Scott Burns, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n (July 2,
2012) [hereinafter Burns Interview].
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standard of review and policy of maintaining an eye for innocence, is adopted by
an office in its entirety and employed by all prosecutors engaged in reviewing
innocence claims. While the specific standards of proof required in the procedural
component outlined in Part III.B are certain to be interpreted differently depending
upon the prosecutor applying the standard, 201 the very process of applying an
objective standard—of stepping away from “gut instinct” and attempting to look
dispassionately at the evidence to determine whether it reaches the appropriate
threshold—forces prosecutors to at least try to excise their biases and train a sharp
eye on the merits of the case before them. This effort—and the support that a clear
office policy of objective review provides for engaging in such an effort—helps to
align prosecutorial postconviction action with the minister of justice role
prosecutors seek to observe.
A. Essential Components of a Framework for Responding to Actual Innocence
Claims
The fundamental principles of a postconviction review regime, detailed
below, are principles that apply as well to a six-prosecutor conviction integrity
review team as to a two-prosecutor district attorney’s office. These basic principles
include (1) fostering an office culture of seeking innocence by integrating the
postconviction review process into the office structure, (2) establishing a policy of
openness by freely authorizing DNA testing and providing open-file discovery,
and (3) encouraging objectivity by creating an office authority position with direct
access to the district attorney responsible for innocence claim review.
1. Fostering an Office Culture of Seeking Innocence
A crucial component for ensuring objective review of postconviction claims is
to develop an office policy of seeking innocence by making the awareness of
wrongful conviction an integral part of office culture. By instituting a standardized
office-wide postconviction review policy, the district attorney sends the message
that prosecutors should seek out wrongful convictions. When prosecutors are
actively involved in the exoneration process pursuant to office policy, it opens up
the possibility for an exoneration to be perceived as an office victory rather than a
public embarrassment. Having the goal of finding the wrongful conviction before it
finds the office incentivizes prosecutors to give claims of innocence an objective
review, harnessing the prosecutor’s naturally competitive spirit in pursuit of
postconviction justice. Moreover, where the district attorney institutes a policy that
acknowledges the reality of wrongful convictions and educates prosecutors on their
common causes, she removes some of the stigma associated with having obtained
a wrongful conviction, which improves office morale, encourages objective
review, and improves the likelihood that prosecutors with postconviction review
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See infra Part III.B.

648

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

responsibilities will not be viewed with suspicion or hostility by others within the
office. 202
District attorneys signal to the office and the public their commitment to
innocence through whom they choose to lead their conviction integrity efforts and
by how they integrate a postconviction review process into the office’s existent
operations. In Dallas County, the past two heads of the conviction integrity unit
have been criminal defense lawyers. 203 To ensure that this individual was not
marginalized and would have the necessary authority to implement desired
reforms, Watkins made him third in command in the office and supervisor over the
office’s existent postconviction units (e.g., the divisions handling appeals and
postconviction writs). 204 In Santa Clara County, David Angel, a highly respected
and long-time prosecutor, was chosen to lead the unit, operate as the office’s third
in command, and oversee appeals, postconviction writs, and all training for the
office. 205 Angel uses the appeals process to set the tone for post- and preconviction
prosecutorial efforts. By refusing to defend questionable prosecutorial ethical
conduct on appeal, Angel requires above-the-constitutional-minimum ethical
conduct from the office’s prosecutors prior to conviction, thereby increasing the
robustness of day-to-day ethics in the office. Doing so also saves costs: ensuring
the office operates well above the constitutional minimum on the front end reduces
the amount of litigation the office faces on the back end in habeas and appeals, and
it makes future claims far easier to defend.206 Entwining postconviction review
efforts with appellate strategy also ensures a uniform office-wide position on
issues of prosecutorial ethics—without it, individual appellate attorneys end up
responding to arguments and resolving immediate problems on a case-by-case
basis, without any connection to an overall office policy to ensure that the mistake
is not repeated in the future. 207
2. Establishing a Policy of Openness and Disclosure
In virtually all of the offices with conviction integrity units, a key part of
sending a message of innocence seeking to prosecutors and the public has been to
adopt a generous policy of DNA testing and file sharing, notwithstanding the lack
202

Where an office establishes as the baseline that wrongful convictions do occur and
that avoiding prosecution of the innocent is a priority, prosecutors essentially will have to
“opt out” of the office default in order to continue adversarial, reflexive responses to
innocence petitions, and, therefore, fewer mistakes will be made in both the pre- and
postconviction contexts. Cf. Neil Savage, Redesigning Banking with Behavioral Economics
in Mind, MIT TECH. REV., Apr. 2011, at 18, 18–19 (citing behavioral economics for the
proposition that where one sets the baseline for conduct matters (e.g., it is easier to
convince someone to try something if they have to opt out rather than opt in)).
203
Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
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See id.
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See Angel Interview, supra note 146.
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See id.
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See id.
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of a postconviction discovery obligation. 208 As each of the offices acknowledged,
there are significant trade-offs—namely, cost—to an open-DNA-testing policy and
an open-file policy. Given the volume of frivolous claims that prosecutors receive,
the costs of open DNA testing and particularly of file sharing are not insignificant.
Nevertheless, a policy of transparency is not only important for detecting the
wrongfully convicted, 209 but also for the message transparency sends to the public
and to prosecutors.
While an open-file policy is a closer case, the benefits of an open-DNAtesting policy exceed the costs, for several reasons. First, the costs of an opentesting policy can, to some extent, be cabined. For instance, most offices require
the requester to make a showing that the results of the testing sought be actually
conclusive as to guilt or innocence prior to footing the bill for the testing. 210
Prosecutors also can implement policies that discourage frivolous testing requests:
in Dallas County, when an inmate requests DNA testing that ultimately confirms
his or her guilt, the district attorney’s office shares information regarding the
request and confirmatory result with the parole board, and that information may
delay access to parole. 211 Second, the costs of DNA testing are relatively low—
especially when compared with the costs of litigating a request under the relevant
state DNA testing statute. 212 According to the Santa Clara County’s district
attorney’s office, the costs of allowing DNA testing are actually lower than the
costs of contesting the requests. 213 Third, the consequences of contesting an
exonerating DNA test are extremely high. A hotly contested DNA exoneration has,
in the past, meant the end of a district attorney’s tenure. 214 It can unnecessarily
extend the imprisonment of an innocent individual, and it can delay arrest of the
real perpetrator—which may allow the statute of limitations to run on charging the
actual perpetrator, not to mention leave the real perpetrator free to commit
additional crimes. 215 Fourth, allowing DNA testing communicates to prosecutors,

208

See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 270 (“A
transparent criminal justice system, one which provides full disclosure of information to
the opposing parties in as timely a manner as possible, should help to reduce the number of
miscarriages of justice.”).
210
See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. If a
murder took place in an alley littered with cigarette butts, prosecutors likely would not be
inclined to pay for testing for each cigarette butt in the hopes that doing so may provide a
lead for an already convicted individual. In other instances, Santa Clara County, for
instance, grants requesters access to any DNA testing they choose, provided that they are
willing to pay for it. Angel Interview, supra note 146. If the requester can meet the
statutory requirement, of course, he or she can have the state cover the costs. See id.
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Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
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See Angel Interview, supra note 146.
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See id.
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See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
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prisoners, defense counsel, and the public that the office is confident in its results
but also open to the possibility of innocence—a move that increases public
confidence in the criminal justice system. Given the relatively low costs of testing,
high costs of litigation, extremely high costs of contesting a valid request for
testing, and benefits to a policy of openness, permitting access to DNA testing
seems to be the clear answer.
Open-file discovery is another important component of a postconviction
review framework, though implementing an open-file policy presents a much
closer case than does DNA testing: the costs are higher and the benefits not as
obvious. No jurisdiction grants a petitioner postconviction discovery as of right, 216
but despite that fact, the majority of the conviction integrity programs discussed
above have an open-file policy. The policy implemented, in each case, is not
without limits—privileged and confidential information is not disclosed by any
office, and the requester typically is required to make some proffer of why the
requested evidence is relevant to her claim of innocence to obtain her file. 217
Offices also cabin costs by requiring requesters or a representative of the requester
to come to an onsite location to view the documents or evidence, rather than
tasking someone within the office with the time-consuming job of photocopying
files. 218 As files become increasingly digitalized, the costs continue to decrease, 219
and because offices are increasingly adopting policies requiring prosecutors to
include every document and piece of evidence related to the case in the file, the
contents of the file will become increasingly accurate as well.220 Finally, as the
Criminal Bureau chief from Cook County noted, because in most offices the
innocence claim reviewer is required to pull and review the file whenever a claim
of actual innocence is received, the added costs of making the file available to the
petitioner are not that high. 221 Indeed, searching for confidential, privileged, or
relevant materials may actually be a helpful exercise, forcing the reviewer to look
My question is simple: what do you have to lose by consenting to testing? If the
results confirm Ms. Labato’s involvement in the murder, then that would
effectively end the case, and Ms. Labato’s conviction would stand. . . . But if the
testing identified someone other than Ms. Labato as the murderer, then that
result could not only serve as compelling evidence of Ms. Labato’s innocence
but also bring the true perpetrator to justice.
Mark Godsey, Tuesday’s Quick Clicks, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (June 26, 2012),
(emphasis omitted) http://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/2012/06/26/tuesdays-quick-clicks1
7/.
216
See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83;
Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111; Valentini Interview, supra note 175; Wilson
Interview, supra note 59.
217
See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
218
See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
219
Angel Interview, supra note 146.
220
See, e.g., id. (requiring written permission from office leadership to withhold any
information from case files).
221
See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
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closely at the file contents when making a determination regarding whether further
investigation is needed.
Unfortunately, the costs of an open-file policy include more than simply
copying or making a file available. However cabined the policy may be, an openfile policy requires already overwhelmed prosecutors to spend valuable time
reviewing case files for privileged and confidential information. In large offices
that handle a significant volume of cases, it may be costly and time intensive to
pull files from off-site locations and to discover the relevant set of files when the
trial prosecutor is no longer with the office. And, of course, more often than not,
this significant time and energy will be expended for a claim that is entirely
without merit.
More significantly, postconviction file sharing is virtually certain to increase
litigation costs. If inmates already are inclined to frivolous claims of actual
innocence, providing inmates with case file information is likely to increase the
number of claims filed and provide fodder to use in giving claims facial validity.
Allegations of Brady violations are also likely to increase where a file contains
information that an inmate may not have seen before. Moreover, for the many
offices that do diligently provide trial discovery and Brady disclosures to opposing
counsel, they are providing inmates with information they already should have
received, via their defense counsel, prior to trial. Because an open-file policy is
certain to increase inmate litigation, to some extent an open-file policy results in
prosecutors subsidizing future frivolous claims with their time and resources.
On the other hand, allowing external review of office files—by inmates or
their lawyers—serves as a valuable backstop to prosecutors’ efforts to ensure a
diligent and objective review of a case file. First, for the typical indigent, convicted
innocent—someone without resources to hire a lawyer or investigator and with no
right to a court-appointed lawyer—the odds of uncovering exculpatory evidence
without prosecutorial assistance are remarkably low. 222 Even for those who were
adequately represented by counsel in the first instance, postconviction review may
be the first opportunity the convicted has to see the inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence assembled by the prosecutor. The inmate’s personal knowledge of the
witnesses involved, the timing of events, and her own alibi may give her an edge
over a prosecutor in terms of identifying relevant exonerating evidence. Moreover,
that inmate and her counsel almost certainly have more time than a prosecutor to
spend reviewing the file. And, of course, innocence projects may also have more
resources to devote to case review, if only they could receive access to
prosecutors’ files. Some innocence projects spend eight months reviewing a case
file—far more time than a prosecutor is able to spend—and review it with an eye
well trained to search for relevant indicators of innocence and consider alternate
forensic testing methods. 223 Although the costs of allowing open-file access are
222

See Rosen, supra note 209, at 284–85.
Id. For instance, in 2004, a man convicted of rape, kidnapping, and murder was
exonerated after seventeen years in prison after new evidence was discovered in his case by
Emory Law students who were interning with the Georgia Innocence Project. The county
223

652

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

certainly high, for prosecutors interested in avoiding injustice and establishing an
office policy that prioritizes innocence seeking, opening their files to inmates in
search of exoneration—even the guilty ones—should be an office priority. Offices
with an open-file policy view it as essential to ensuring that the public not view
prosecutors as trying to conceal bad facts. As the head of the Dallas County
Conviction Integrity Unit, Russell Wilson, explained, referencing the prosecutor’s
duty to ensure justice, “Let’s get to the merits—either it’s a good case or not.” 224
By sharing case files and allowing DNA testing, the prosecutor moves away
from the adversarial role that often inheres in prosecution by the nature of the
investigation, indictment, and trial process, and moves closer to the minister of
justice ideal. Creating an office policy of openness to some extent forces
prosecutors to put aside the “defend the conviction” mentality and accept the
consequences of an outside evaluation of the case on the merits. That this is true
for all cases, not just for those cases where inmates have made some sort of
showing of merit or prosecutorial misconduct, also establishes an ethos in the
office that openness and disclosure is simply office policy—not an attempt by a
postconviction inspector general to delve through the files of hardworking
prosecutors trying to do their jobs. Indeed, a policy of openness with regard to
DNA testing and file sharing promotes a mentality within the office more akin to
the “neutral administrative agency” role advocated by Professors Green and
Yaroshefsky. 225 This type of office culture makes finding the innocent needle in
the haystack far more likely than it would be otherwise. While a policy of
transparency is not without significant cost, for those prosecutors truly concerned
about righting the wrongs of wrongful conviction, the benefits outweigh the costs.
3. Facilitating Objective Review and Neutralizing Prosecutorial Biases
Perhaps most importantly, to recognize a wrongful conviction, prosecutors
need objectivity, a legitimate challenge in an environment where conviction
statistics often are the measure of a good prosecutor. 226 That challenge is

district attorney’s office had told Clarence Harrison that all of the evidence in his case had
been destroyed, but the interns discovered a slide of the rapist’s semen from the victim’s
rape kit in Harrison’s files, a slide that ultimately exonerated him of the crime. Guilty Until
Proven Innocent, EMORY MAG. (2005), http://www.emory.edu/EMORY_MAGAZINE/spri
ng_2005/innocence2.html.
224
Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
225
See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 506 (citing Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2124 (1998)).
226
Id. at 511 (“Whoever engages in [postconviction review] should not reflexively
seek to uphold the prior conviction, but should at least be neutral and open-minded if not,
as in the Dallas office, skeptical regarding the legitimacy of the conviction.”). As Richard
Rosen has noted, while there must be a presumption of guilt after conviction in order for
the U.S. criminal justice system to operate, that rebuttable presumption unnecessarily and
unfairly burdens the convicted innocent: “Because it is now clear that wrongful convictions
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compounded by the fact that the number of valid innocence claims is so low when
compared with the number of baseless innocence claims prosecutors must review.
A member of the Harris County postconviction review team explained, “Our job
entails probably 90 percent failure.” 227 Nevertheless, the conviction integrity units
studied all structured the review process to maximize the objectivity and neutrality
of the reviewer, first and foremost by ensuring postconviction review was directed
by an office authority, not by the original prosecutor in the case.
The conviction integrity unit prosecutors interviewed were unanimous in
noting the importance of ensuring that postconviction review was directed by an
office authority. 228 While data on postconviction review processes (and any
internal district attorney offices’ processes) are notoriously difficult to obtain, the
general wisdom is that in many, and possibly the majority, of prosecutors’ offices
across the country, postconviction claims of innocence are automatically assigned
to the original prosecutor. 229 Even in those offices where appellate divisions handle
postconviction matters, the original prosecutor is frequently consulted, 230 as that
individual is considered the office authority on the case. It is possible the
prosecutor has information regarding the case that is not included within the case
file. Accordingly, many offices view that prosecutor as best positioned to defend
the conviction, in terms of experience, personal knowledge, and office efficiency.
While this assignment system makes sense as a matter of prosecutorial efficiency,
and if the goal is defending the conviction alone, it is counterproductive to
determining the validity of the innocence claim. As various scholars have
observed, prosecutors have strong institutional, professional, and cognitive
incentives that tend toward resisting claims of innocence, particularly when the
conviction was one an individual personally obtained. 231 For that reason, involving
occur, thought should be given to changing those aspects of the system that unfairly burden
innocent people who find themselves among the convicted.” Rosen, supra note 209, at 281.
227
Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83. One can query whether not finding more
innocent petitioners is truly a “failure,” since often these investigations—and particularly
DNA testing—confirm the guilt of the person already in prison, bolstering the credibility of
the criminal justice system.
228
See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83;
Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111; Valentini Interview, supra note 175; Wilson
Interview, supra note 59.
229
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 509 n.250; Medwed, supra note 8, at 143–
44.
230
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 509 n.249; Medwed, supra note 8, at 143–
44.
231
Medwed, supra note 8, at 143–48. Gauging prosecutorial success usually breaks
down along the prosecutor’s “win” (conviction) and “loss” record, and this data is often
used in promotion decisions. Medwed, supra note 18, at 44. Moreover, prosecutors
generally bring charges against defendants whom they think are guilty, and the affirmation
of a jury verdict frequently can boost a lawyer’s confidence in the defendant’s guilt—a
confidence that may be difficult to shake by a convict’s assertion of innocence (which often
requires additional investigation to confirm). Id. at 45; Medwed, supra note 8, at 142–43.
In addition, questioning a conviction may cause tension with police investigators with
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the original prosecutor in the postconviction review process often can make
objective review of that claim more challenging than it would be otherwise. 232
The most effective postconviction review systems isolate the original
prosecutor from the investigation until a preliminary opinion has been formed by
the reviewing attorney. In Harris County, prosecutors conduct a full investigation
and reach a preliminary conclusion before contacting the original prosecutor to
solicit his or her views on guilt or innocence. 233 While postconviction review
prosecutors have reached a preliminary opinion at that time, the conversation with
the original prosecutor is far from pro forma. 234 The prosecuting attorney’s
personal experience with the case and its accompanying investigation may yield
some information or insight that postconviction review prosecutors have missed. 235
Moreover, if the original prosecutor is convinced of the inmate’s guilt and the
reviewer is convinced of the inmate’s innocence, engaging in a dialogue with that
prosecutor may be useful in understanding what went wrong in the original case,
helping the original prosecutor understand what subsequent evidence has indicated,
preparing the strongest possible argument in favor of innocence, and preparing for
a pitch to the district attorney or the office’s executive management committee.
While the original prosecutor may have valuable insight to add (though often
prosecutors will not even remember the prosecution), 236 a fresh set of eyes is key
to unbiased review. Not only does the original prosecutor have a vested interest in
maintaining the conviction, but her view on the guilt or innocence of the inmate is
irrelevant in the postconviction context—the odds are high that the original
prosecutor thought the defendant was guilty, or otherwise she would not have
brought the case 237—and that view almost certainly would have been validated by

whom a prosecutor works, where that investigator is convinced of the defendant’s guilt,
and particularly where a confession or evidence may have been achieved by investigative
overreaching. Medwed, supra note 8, at 144–45; Medwed, supra note 18, at 45–46.
Prosecutorial bias also is impacted by macrolevel incentives: prosecutors’ offices often
gauge their own success by their office’s overall conviction record, and politicians and the
electorate consider these factors in assessing prosecutorial effectiveness. Medwed, supra
note 18, at 45. This results in pressure on line attorneys to uphold their convictions and on
chief prosecutors to ensure the same. Id.; see also MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25
(discussing various cognitive biases that naturally occur in police investigation and
criminal prosecution, including “confirmation bias” or “expectancy bias” and “belief
perseverance,” that tend to contribute to tunnel vision on the part of police and
prosecutors).
232
Medwed, supra note 8, at 142–48.
233
See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.
234
See id.
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See id.
236
See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
237
Prosecutors may not bring charges without “probable cause.” Green &
Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 497; see also United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1315
(11th Cir. 2006). This standard is incorporated in state ethics rules. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2013). Some prosecutor’s offices have set a higher standard

2014]

THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S DILEMMA

655

the jury’s verdict in the case. Fresh review by a prosecutor not involved in the
original conviction, who is looking at the evidence for the first time and evaluating
motives, alibis, and witness credibility without the pressure of public impatience
for an arrest, a police investigator’s belief in the individual’s guilt, the ticking
clock of the Speedy Trial Act, 238 or a looming trial date, may go a long way toward
ensuring objective review of a past conviction. 239
Of course, even where the original prosecutor is not involved in reviewing a
postconviction claim of innocence, collegial relationships can often be an obstacle
to unbiased review. When prosecutors are called upon to review the work of their
peers or former peers, personal relationships may color their interpretation of the
case or the prosecutorial conduct involved in the case. 240 A prosecutor who
discovers intentional misconduct or potentially sanctionable conduct when
reviewing an innocence claim may be reticent to report it because of the fear of
negative implications (sanctions or damage to professional reputation) for a
colleague; negative reaction from other prosecutors or police investigators for
having second-guessed the decision or reported the misconduct of a colleague; 241
and professional consequences for one’s self, should discovery of a wrongful
conviction damage office statistics or hurt the reelection chances of the district
attorney. 242
The challenges inherent in reviewing a peer’s conviction underscore the
importance of having an office authority engage in the initial review or at least
closely oversee the postconviction review process. In Dallas, Harris, Santa Clara,
and Manhattan, the initial postconviction review typically is performed by a
prosecutor who is the third most senior in the office or a member of the district
attorney’s management team. 243 At that level of seniority and with the established
credibility attendant to that position, the reviewer is likely to be less concerned
about potential professional consequences resulting from unwinding a conviction,
and her conclusions are much more likely to carry weight among line prosecutors
and the district attorney. In addition, as someone who is in a supervisory position
and therefore is frequently required to evaluate and review other prosecutors’
performance, a senior prosecutor is less likely to be swayed by peer pressure and
the social hazards inherent in investigating a colleague’s conviction. Indeed, a
long-time prosecutor who has reached the senior ranks of the office likely has
experience engaging in postmortem review of other prosecutors’ mistakes or
within their office, however, requiring that the prosecutor be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. See, e.g., Vance, Jr., supra note 107.
238
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012).
239
MEDWED, supra note 119, at 127–28.
240
Medwed, supra note 8, at 175–76.
241
The danger exists that conviction integrity units may be viewed by prosecutors as
an office “inspector general”—someone constantly looking over prosecutors’ shoulders
and second-guessing their discretionary choices. See id.at 176.
242
Id. at 134–37, 156–57, 176.
243
See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83;
Meet the Executive Team, supra note 123; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
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alleged misconduct. Perhaps most importantly, a senior prosecutor—particularly
the third most senior in the office—has direct access to the district attorney, which
ensures that her conclusions regarding guilt or innocence are not filtered by others
who may have conflicting incentives with regard to the case being investigated.
Of course, having an experienced prosecutor engage in postconviction review
comes with its own potential hazards. To be sure, if cynicism is a problem among
prosecutors who review stacks of frivolous innocence claims, presumably a more
senior prosecutor, who has spent more years watching the guilty claim innocence,
would experience a higher degree of innate skepticism. It may be more difficult
under those circumstances for that person to review an innocence claim with the
objectivity and detachment necessary to detect actual innocence. It is for this
reason that some have suggested the use of outside advisory committees to review
postconviction claims of innocence, 244 and this is perhaps why Dallas County uses
defense lawyers to head its conviction integrity unit. On the other hand, most
prosecutors’ offices across the country lack the resources to hire someone from
outside the office to engage in postconviction review. 245 Moreover, bringing in
someone from the outside—and particularly a defense lawyer—to engage in an
oversight function over career prosecutors may result not only in morale problems
and division within the office (given the traditional cultural-adversarial divide
between prosecutors and defense lawyers), but it may make line prosecutors more
resistant to postconviction review than they would be if the process were being
directed by an experienced prosecutor whom they respected. 246 Indeed, the
importance of having a senior, highly respected prosecutor leading the
postconviction review process was a common refrain among conviction integrity
unit directors. 247 Most of the conviction integrity unit prosecutors considered a
seasoned prosecutor to be better positioned to assess the validity of an earlier
conviction and more likely to have that prosecutor’s conclusions regarding guilt or
innocence respected by other prosecutors in the office, and, for that reason, better
able to create the culture of innocence seeking necessary to achieve an effective
postconviction review process. 248 Whether it is a senior prosecutor or a seasoned
criminal defense lawyer at the helm, having a well-respected lawyer with highlevel office authority leading any postconviction effort is essential to that effort’s
success.
B. Tiered Review
The three principles outlined above are essential to a strong postconviction
review regime, but without a well-defined set of standards to guide the review
process itself, postconviction review may still be subject to prosecutorial biases.
244

See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
See Burns Interview, supra note 200.
246
See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
247
See id.; Angel Interview, supra note 146.
248
See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
245
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This section creates a clear set of guidelines to direct prosecutorial discretion, a
framework that instructs prosecutors on when additional investigation is
appropriate, when they should drop opposition to a petition claiming innocence,
and when their ethical obligations require active support of an innocence claim.
Standardized review is essential to an effective postconviction review process; 249
where prosecutors have no articulable standard to guide their discretion, the justice
they administer is likely to vary case by case, based on the prosecutor who reviews
it. Where prosecutors rely solely on their instincts to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of a case, inherent biases are more likely to play a role in decision
making, and racial and socio-economic inequity is more likely to result. 250
Such standards are notably absent from the conviction integrity units
discussed above. Instead, the effectiveness, efficiency, and accuracy of the
postconviction review process rely entirely on the appropriately exercised
discretion of prosecutors. 251 In describing how each determined what petitions to
support, prosecutors used expressions like “you know it when you see it,” “when it
keeps you up at night,” and “no scientific formula.” 252 But the problem with the
“you know it when you see it” standard in this context is that the convicted
innocent quite often are in jail because they appeared to be guilty in the first
instance—indeed, the original prosecutor may likewise have become convinced of
guilt based on a gut instinct. Only a small fraction of wrongful convictions are a
product of prosecutorial misconduct. 253 Far more often, wrongful convictions
occur because well-meaning, dedicated, hard-working prosecutors simply fail to
detect the flaws in their cases. 254 This mistake is even more likely in the
postconviction context, where convictions are stamped with the authority of a
previous prosecutor, a jury, and often multiple rounds of judges (on appeal and in
habeas) and where there are a variety of other incentives toward upholding a
conviction that the prosecutor may not even detect affecting her judgment. 255
The framework below—derived by combining the experience of conviction
integrity units with the experience of convicted innocents—is a first step at
249

See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
As Angela Davis has observed, unfettered prosecutorial discretion lends itself to
discrimination and inconsistent justice. See DAVIS, supra note 52, at 5.
251
The Dallas Conviction Integrity Unit has been run since its inception by
prosecutors who spent their career as criminal defense lawyers, and for that reason they
bring to the job a unique set of biases that in some cases may vary fairly dramatically from
those of the typical prosecutor. See Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
252
See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; Valentini Interview, supra note 175;
Manhattan ADA Interview, supra note 111.
253
See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 208.
254
See MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25.
255
See id.; Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 516–20 (2007) (outlining ways in which cognitive bias affects
prosecutors); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 183–86 (2007) (exploring prosecutorial passion as an
influence on prosecutors’ decisions in plea bargaining).
250
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prescribing a comprehensive standard for prosecutors’ offices to apply in
reviewing postconviction cases. There is certain to be disagreement among
prosecutors and among scholars as to which standard of proof strikes the
appropriate balance between the need to ferret out the convicted innocent and the
need to protect the many other important functions served by this nation’s
prosecutors. Most important, though, is that prosecutors adopt some clear
framework to govern prosecutorial discretion, and the below proposal is an attempt
to begin a conversation on how the specific contours of that framework should
look.
1. Initial Screening Procedures and When Investigation Is Warranted: Stating a
Claim of Innocence
A cost-effective middle ground for identifying the convicted innocent without
wasting prosecutorial resources would require an inmate to state a claim of actual
innocence by pointing to either some new evidence not presented to the jury
(broadly defined) or a sufficiently serious allegation of misconduct that one might
question the integrity of the criminal justice process the petitioner received, a
factor that would increase the likelihood that an actually innocent individual had
been convicted. 256 Where an inmate “states a claim” of this nature, further
investigation is warranted. 257 And where the underlying case bears the red flags of
a wrongful conviction, prosecutors should employ detailed checklists to ensure no
new evidence is overlooked. 258 Moreover, conviction integrity prosecutors cast a
256

Santa Clara also reviews a third category of cases: those brought to its attention by
credible, well-respected defense counsel. See Angel Interview, supra note 146. There is no
doubt that concerns expressed by reputable, experienced defense counsel about a
conviction can be a good indicator of a wrongful conviction. Nevertheless, announcing a
policy of investigating “reputable” defense counsel concerns raises at least two problems:
(1) prosecutors will end up engaging in their own ad hoc evaluation of credibility—
meaning that in some instances compliant defense counsel will be rewarded with
postconviction attention while defense counsel less willing to “play nice” will not, and (2)
defense counsel will begin to interpret their duty to represent their clients zealously to
include an obligation to raise a pro forma innocence claim with the local district attorney’s
office. Neither of these scenarios would help conserve resources or serve justice.
257
Other innocence-inquiry bodies employ a similar or slightly lower standard. In
England, the Criminal Cases Review Commission engages in a screening for “bare
eligibility”—namely, that the conviction occurred within its jurisdiction and that all appeals
be exhausted. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 491 & n.137. Likewise, the North
Carolina Innocence Commission conducts an initial screening to determine whether the
petitioner is claiming complete factual innocence based on “credible” and “verifiable”
evidence that had not previously been heard. Id. at 492.
258
Research suggests that lawyers can be “primed” to focus on certain aspects of their
identity (e.g., a prosecutor’s “minister of justice” role) through reflection and can in this
way neutralize cognitive biases that may otherwise impact their decision making. See
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1,
45–47 (2009). For that reason, careful review of a checklist—and the reflection doing so
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wide net in the claims they are willing to review, even considering claims where
statutes of limitations have expired, where petitioners have no postconviction
recourse left, and where individuals have pled guilty or state statutes of limitations
on their ability to claim innocence have run.
Where a petitioner articulates some sort of discernible innocence claim,
conviction integrity units engage in further screening to determine whether
investigation is needed, 259 most often by pulling the individual’s case file and
communicating with the individual or her attorney by phone or letter, a process
that is not terribly time intensive. 260 In the case of Harris County, where this
screening indicates the potential for forensic evidence that may be persuasive on
the question of guilt or innocence, further investigation will be conducted. 261
Dallas County imposes a threshold question of whether the innocence claim (or
other information in the prosecutor’s possessions) indicates the potential for new
exculpatory evidence, a standard it equates with the required Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) showing in civil cases: Does the applicant state a cognizable
innocence claim? 262 If the answer is affirmative, the office undertakes further
investigation.
Imposing a “new evidence” requirement for additional investigation makes
sense from the perspectives of conserving resources, respecting finality, and
deferring to a jury verdict, but it only makes sense from the perspective of freeing
the convicted innocent if the term “new evidence” is broadly defined. For instance,
evidence that could have or should have been discovered by diligent trial counsel
does not qualify as “new evidence” under some state innocence statutes. 263 In the
realm of wrongful conviction, one cannot assume diligent defense counsel. 264 In
Harry Miller’s case, for instance, Miller—who ultimately was wrongfully
convicted of robbery—had a virtually irrefutable alibi that his attorney was aware
of, but defense counsel nevertheless failed to call witnesses that could substantiate
entails—may allow prosecutors to neutralize the cognitive biases that may result in a
reflexive decision that an individual is guilty.
259
Many of the letters prosecutors receive never require prosecutors to pull a case file
or call the claimant in prison because many do not allege factual (or “actual”) innocence,
but rather they complain about prison conditions or the sentence received or attempt to
reargue the evidence presented to the jury at trial. See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18,
at 512. According to former Dallas County Conviction Integrity Director Mike Ware,
during his tenure, at least 25% of the claims his office received had nothing to do with
factual innocence and could be dismissed with no further effort. See id. at 512 n.259. When
it is unclear whether a factual claim of innocence is being made, these offices often call the
inmate or send a letter requesting further information, a low-cost process that typically
screens out additional petitioners. See id.; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
260
See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note
83; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
261
See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.
262
See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 512 & n.258.
263
See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1671 (2008).
264
See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 10, 165–67; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at
41–43 (recognizing the role of inadequate defense counsel in wrongful conviction).
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the alibi, relying instead upon Miller’s testimony alone. 265 While the testimony of
these witnesses was not “new” or newly discovered in the postconviction phase,
that testimony demonstrated clearly Miller’s innocence and was evidence that the
jury that convicted him never heard. 266 The United States’s indigent defense
system is populated by a significant number of skilled, under-paid, diligent defense
counsel, but it also contains a number of defense attorneys who are not diligent and
whose lack of commitment to criminal cases is only exacerbated by local and state
governments’ refusal to adequately pay defense counsel. 267 Given the deficiencies
of the U.S. indigent defense system, it is not realistic to assume trial counsel
diligence in determining whether evidence qualifies as “new.”
Just as an assumption of trial counsel diligence makes little sense when
identifying the convicted innocent, another common “new evidence” requirement
in state innocence statutes—that to qualify as “new” the evidence must be
admissible—would deny exoneration to many of the wrongfully convicted and
would put prosecutors in a difficult moral dilemma. There is a great deal of
inadmissible evidence that may influence a prosecutor’s decision to charge an
individual and likewise a great deal of inadmissible evidence that may influence
his or her belief regarding an inmate’s guilt or innocence; 268 this evidence should
influence prosecutorial judgment in both instances. Special Assistant District
Attorney Angel enunciated a “new evidence” standard that strikes a balance
between respecting the finality of a jury verdict, the importance of conserving
investigative resources for meritorious cases, and the need to actually exonerate the
wrongfully convicted: there “has to be some new evidence that was not presented
to [the] jury already or some really legitimate allegation of misconduct of some
sort—(such as the) evidence was there, but something went so wrong that we can’t
trust [the criminal justice] process.” 269
2. When Actual Innocence Claims Warrant Further Investigation: A Bona Fide
Dispute as to Guilt
Knowing how far to proceed in the investigation process is far more
challenging than making the discrete decision to engage in an investigation. In the
preconviction context, the Model Rules are silent with regard to investigative
directives, and even the more aspirational ABA Prosecution Function Standards
discuss investigation in terms of proscriptions (e.g., avoiding invidious
discrimination and use of illegal means to investigate) rather than prescriptions for

265

See Stephen Dark, An Innocent Man, SALT LAKE CITY WEEKLY (June 23, 2011),
http://www.cityweekly.net/utah/article-35-14164-an-innocent-man.html?current_page=1.
266
Id.
267
See generally JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 171–73, 201
(2007) (discussing Virginia’s notoriously underfunded indigent defense system).
268
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 500.
269
Angel Interview, supra note 146.
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aspirational ethical conduct. 270 While the question involves a significant degree of
prosecutorial discretion, one clear guideline prosecutors can apply in deciding
whether to continue to pursue exculpatory evidence is to question whether a bona
fide issue as to the guilt of the petitioner still exists. 271 If one views the decision to
investigate in the first place as tied to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)type standard, the decision to terminate an investigation could be seen to turn on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a): the investigation ends when there remains
“no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” 272
Of course, knowing whether a dispute is “genuine” is the challenge in these
cases, a challenge exacerbated by the fact that often the postconviction
investigation occurs ten, twenty, or thirty years after the crime originally was
committed. Conducting an investigation years after the fact poses very serious
challenges. Witnesses may no longer be available, and some evidence not
preserved. Prosecutors may be called upon to make credibility determinations with
regard to recanting witnesses and, in doing so, are forced to engage in some degree
of second-guessing the jury that initially heard and believed those witnesses’
testimonies. 273 Witness recollections—unreliable under even the best circumstances—are likely to be further weakened by the passage of time. 274 For that
reason, prosecutors must question how much weight to give a jury verdict vis-à-vis
their own objective assessment of the postconviction state of the evidence. There is
inherent subjectivity in this type of assessment, which is why Harris County limits
its postconviction review to only those cases where objective, definitive forensic
evidence of innocence exists. 275
Limiting postconviction review to only forensically resolvable cases,
however, would knock out a significant number of cases where individuals clearly
merit exoneration. Thomas Haynesworth, the exonerated defendant mentioned in
the Introduction, would not be a free man under this standard. And while
nonforensic new evidence poses an exponentially larger challenge for investigators
and prosecutors, there are objective indicia prosecutors can look to in assessing a
petitioner’s claim of innocence: consistency in accounts; 276 the credibility of the
270
See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 3-3.1 to 3-3.11 (3d ed. 1993), available at http://ww
w.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_d
efense_function.authcheckdam.pdf
271
This standard is a variation on one found in the Utah innocence statute, under
which, in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must demonstrate a “bona fide
issue as to whether the petitioner is factually innocent.” Miller v. State, 226 P.3d 743, 747
(Utah Ct. App. 2010) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(6)(b)(i) (LexisNexis Supp.
2009)).
272
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
273
See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
274
GARRETT, supra note 19, at 48, 72 (referencing the fallibility of eyewitness
testimony and the unreliability of long-term memory).
275
See Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83.
276
See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.

662

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

petitioner; untested DNA evidence or DNA evidence for which there now exist
improved testing techniques; 277 or trial testimony of questionable forensic accuracy
(e.g., hair comparison, fingerprint analysis, or blood-typing). Indeed, prosecutors
can and should inform their nonforensic investigations by educating their attorneys
and investigators on the typical hallmarks of wrongful conviction. 278 Prosecutors
should engage in the search for evidence of innocence with the same diligence
with which they would search for evidence of guilt pretrial, but because they only
need worry about convincing their office—not a jury—they can end an
investigation where they become sufficiently convinced of the inmate’s innocence.
As in the pretrial context, detailed checklists may serve an important role in
ensuring that an investigation covers all necessary bases and does not fall prey to
tunnel vision. Likewise, training prosecutor office investigators, local police, and
the local crime lab on common mistakes that lead to wrongful conviction and how
to identify such convictions may well help these individuals avoid confirmatory
bias when engaging in postconviction review. Such training also serves to
streamline and reduce the costs of the investigation process—ensuring that not
only prosecutors, but their investigators, know what to look for and how to do so
efficiently.
Estimating the added costs of engaging in this type of investigation is
impossible, because regimes will vary depending upon the caseload and
willingness to pay of each jurisdiction, as well as each office’s evidence retention
policies (those offices that do not retain evidence from old cases are necessarily
limited in their ability to reinvestigate old cases). Of the conviction integrity units
discussed above, Dallas County and Harris County employ two attorneys who
work full time on the postconviction review process, typically one senior and one
more junior prosecutor. 279 While Dallas County was able to obtain additional
funding to initiate its postconviction program, Harris County simply had to divert
resources from other office programs. 280 One could estimate the additional cost for
hiring additional prosecutors, plus a full-time investigator as most programs
277

Id. Of course, New York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance has observed that
in the two years that the county’s conviction integrity unit has functioned, it has not
encountered any cases in which exonerating DNA evidence existed. See Vance, Jr., supra
note 107.
278
See Cynthia E. Jones, supra note 46, at 2927–29 (identifying four “leading causes
of wrongful convictions”). There is a significant volume of high-quality scholarship
exploring the common causes of wrongful convictions and identifying eyewitness
identification, confessions, government informant testimony, and non-DNA forensic
analysis of physical evidence as some of the most prevalent causes. That discussion is
outside the scope of this Article, but in the past five years, there have been several very
interesting statistical analyses done on this topic. See generally GARRETT, supra note 19;
GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5; PETRO & PETRO, supra note 6.
279
Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; Wilson Interview, supra note 59. Cf.
Valentini Interview, supra note 175 (employing four attorneys).
280
See Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83;
Wilson Interview, supra note 59. Cook County also found a way to fund the program
internally, without any additional resources. See Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
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have, 281 but adopting a full conviction integrity unit is simply not practical for the
majority of district attorneys’ offices across the country, 282 particularly given the
public’s well-documented underfunding of programs that benefit the
incarcerated. 283 Postconviction review in other places is bound to look much
different. Prosecutors can ration the diversion of resources from ongoing cases to
these types of postconviction investigations by tackling innocence claims on a
triage basis, with the most serious offenses and longest-incarcerated defendants’
cases taken up first. Indeed, this is standard practice for some conviction integrity
units. 284
While the costs of postconviction investigation are significant, postconviction
investigations do have some innate efficiencies over those conducted pretrial. In
the pretrial context, police detectives conduct the investigation, select a suspect,
and then present the results of their investigation to a prosecutor—a process that
often transfers investigative tunnel vision to prosecutorial tunnel vision.285 In the
postconviction context, the prosecutor actively directs the investigation from
beginning to end (often through its own investigators in offices that employ those).
For that reason, prosecutors have a unique ability to ensure that resources are
directed only toward the specific nodes of a case that may point toward innocence.
And, of course, while police officers often operate without immediate legal
direction indicating when and whether they have met their burden of proof, where
prosecutors direct an investigation, they can expand or stop the investigation
immediately when the standards set forth in this framework have been met. For
instance, where prosecutors are able to confirm guilt (such as by receiving a
confirmatory DNA analysis) or to confirm the lack of a bona fide issue (such as by
finding definitive evidence contradicting a petitioner’s specific innocence claim or
discovering his or her story directly contradicted by multiple other credible
witnesses in the case), they should conclude the investigation.
More importantly, though, the dollars spent on investigation may result in
equivalent savings in litigation costs—regardless of whether the investigation
reveals additional evidence of innocence or guilt. In the face of an explosion of
postconviction habeas and actual innocence claims, prosecutors’ typical response
is to review the case file and the transcripts of a case and refute the petitioner’s
claims on that basis. This may be effective in securing a speedy dismissal where a
petitioner is pro se, but in cases with some merit or where the Innocence Project,
pro bono counsel, or diligent defense counsel is involved, the litigation may take
years or be accompanied by bruising media attention, and the petitioner may have
to work through not only habeas requests, but requests for DNA testing, actual
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See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note
83; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
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See Burns Interview, supra note 200.
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See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 570 n.242 (2001).
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See, e.g., Angel Interview, supra note 146; Valentini Interview, supra note 175.
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See MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25.
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innocence petitions, and then litigation over wrongful conviction compensation. 286
Some hotly contested cases could be far more quickly disposed of if the
prosecution discovered more conclusive evidence of guilt. Further, many of these
cases could be disposed of far more quickly—and without the added years of
litigation costs, media embarrassment, and wrongful incarceration—by an up-front
investment in independent investigation. No doubt prosecutorial funds will be
spent investigating more meritless claims of innocence than meritorious ones; but
overall, the costs of proactively exploring guilt or innocence may be smaller than
the costs of reactively claiming guilt until the petitioner can prove otherwise. And,
of course, this cost-effective response has the added benefit of better serving
justice, which is the primary mission of the prosecutor’s office.
Postconviction review also promises to generate preconviction efficiencies.
The discovery of valid innocence claims through postconviction review
communicates unequivocally to line prosecutors that wrongful conviction occurs
and, further, educates them on the warning signs of a potential wrongful
conviction. This in turn improves investigative practices, trial strategy, and office
disclosure policies. As Dallas County District Attorney Craig Watkins observed
about his conviction integrity unit, “What we’ve created is a laboratory where we
can study the failure of the system.” 287 Use of lessons learned from that laboratory
may help prosecutors’ offices weed out indictments that should be dismissed and
prosecutors who are not taking seriously their ethical obligation to uphold
justice, 288 and it may even reveal a pattern of inadequate Brady observance that
may require revision of office practices on the front end of the criminal justice
system. The office education on wrongful conviction that is likely to accompany
adoption of a standardized review framework therefore offers not only to reduce
the incidence of wrongful conviction, but it also offers to reduce resources wasted
286

See, e.g., Dark, supra note 265; Wade Goodwyn, Free After 25 Years: A Tale of
Murder and Injustice, NPR (Apr. 28, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/28/150
996459/free-after-25-years-a-tale-of-murder-and-injustice?ps=rs; Brandi Grissom, Williamson Prosecutor Asserts a Change of Heart, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/11/18/us/williamson-prosecutor-john-bradley-has-a-change-of-heart.ht
ml?_r=1&pagewanted=all%22%20%5Co%20%22Times%20article (summarizing Michael
Morton’s long battle for exoneration, which included requests for case files and DNA
testing, followed by a request for an innocence petition); Emiley Morgan, After Being
Imprisoned for 3 1/2 Years, Man Exonerated in 2003 Robbery, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 12,
2011, 1:29 PM) http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705390718/ After-being-imprisonedfor-3-12-years-man-exonerated-in-2003-robbery.html?pg=2 (detai-ling Harry Miller’s long
battle for exoneration, which included a contested appeal, a petition for actual innocence,
and ultimately the pursuit of compensation).
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Leslie Wimmer, Dallas County DA Speaks to Fort Worth Community, FORT
WORTH BUS. PRESS (July 20, 2010, 5:12 PM) http://fwbusinesspress55.1upprelaunch.com/
main.asp?SectionID=18&SubSectionID=43&ArticleID=12597.
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See MEDWED, supra note 119, at 22–25 (discussing various cognitive biases that
naturally occur in police investigation and criminal prosecution, including “confirmation
bias” or “expectancy bias” and “belief perseverance,” that tend to contribute to tunnel
vision on the part of police and prosecutors); Medwed, supra note 8, at 139–40.
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on investigating the wrong suspect or conducting trials that are likely to end in
acquittals or mistrials. In other words, postconviction review, and the lessons
learned from it, promise future preconviction savings.
3. When Actual Innocence Claims Require a Prosecutor to Drop Opposition to
Release: A Reasonable Likelihood of Innocence
Once an investigation is concluded, the prosecutor faces the thorny question
of what to do and what her ethical obligations require when doubts remain about
the conviction’s validity. Model Rule 3.8(h) suggests that a prosecutor should
“seek to remedy the conviction” when “clear and convincing evidence” shows the
defendant was wrongfully convicted. 289 Green and Yaroshefsky consider the
Model Rules standard too high and assert that a prosecutor should seek an inmate’s
release upon determining that the defendant is “probably innocent.” 290 While it is
certainly true that “the state and federal government have an obligation to free
innocent individuals,” 291 a question remains regarding how much certainty is
required for prosecutors to advocate for release and whether a lesser level of
certainty would counsel prosecutors to defer to postconviction judicial processes.
This would passively allow convicted individuals to free themselves by not
opposing such efforts, rather than bringing the full weight of the executive to bear
in favor of their release. This Article suggests a difference between those two
actions on the part of the government, and while Green and Yaroshefsky make a
compelling case that the “probably innocent” standard is sufficient for dropping
prosecutorial opposition to postconviction claims of innocence, a higher degree of
certainty may be required for active prosecutorial attempts to secure exoneration.
The “probably innocent” standard that Green and Yaroshefsky propose, which
seems to be roughly equivalent to a “reasonable likelihood of innocence”
standard, 292 may trigger a moral obligation on the part of the prosecutor not to
oppose release, 293 but it seems to fall short of the level of conviction required to
campaign for the release of someone who was convicted by a jury and whose
conviction was upheld by multiple judges. Given the far cry from anything
approximating certainty that “probably innocent” denotes, it may not be in the best
interest of society, finality, justice, or a prosecutor’s political reputation to actively
seek to free or exonerate that individual. While, as discussed below, state statutory
innocence standards need not bind prosecutors, where they are only 51%
289

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h) (2013).
See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 508.
291
Id. at 505.
292
Id. at 516 (“When a prosecutor concludes that a convicted defendant is reasonably
likely to be innocent, the appropriate steps may vary depending on the jurisdiction . . . .”);
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (2013) (imposing an investigatory
obligation on the prosecutor where “new, credible and material evidence creat[es] a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the
defendant was convicted”).
293
See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 516.
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convinced of innocence, justice may be better served by deferring to the criminal
justice process, the jury verdict, and postconviction judicial review procedures
rather than substituting an uncertain prosecutor’s opinion for their judgments.
Conviction integrity prosecutors spoke frequently about the challenge of respecting
a jury verdict while engaging in postconviction review. 294 Where new evidence
causes a prosecutor to doubt a conviction, but further investigation leaves that
prosecutor only with the conclusion that the individual is “probably innocent,”
there is still a very good chance that the convicted individual is, in fact, guilty. A
prosecutor should only seek to keep someone in prison when convinced of that
person’s guilt—just as a prosecutor should only seek to convict an individual of
whose guilt the prosecutor is convinced 295—but a higher standard is required for
that prosecutor to actively work toward that individual’s release. 296
4. When Actual Innocence Claims Require a Prosecutor to Affirmatively Assist in
Release: The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
As discussed above, there can be a significant difference in both outcome and
perception when a prosecutor’s office calls for an individual’s exoneration versus
when a prosecutor drops opposition to an actual innocence petition, and for that
reason, it makes sense that a different standard of proof would attach to one
outcome over the other. Under Model Rule 3.8(h), a prosecutor must seek to
“remedy” a conviction when “clear and convincing evidence” establishes existence
of a wrongful conviction. 297 Of course, under the Model Rules, the steps necessary
to meet this duty to “remedy” are not, in fact, all that onerous:
Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant,
requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent
defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor
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See, e.g., Chin & O’Neil Interview, supra note 83; Valentini Interview, supra note
175; Wilson Interview, supra note 59.
295
See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 60
N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (May 1988).
296
The ethical challenges associated with determining whether to support a
petitioner’s request for release or exoneration are often further complicated by generational
shifts in prosecutorial culture. In offices where prosecutorial culture has shifted from
conviction seeking to justice seeking, an investigation may reveal cases that were
prosecuted successfully years ago but likely would not be prosecuted today based on the
same evidence. See Valentini Interview, supra note 175. Again, the question of how to
proceed must revolve around the legal standard: if the prosecutor believes the defendant to
be “probably innocent,” he or she likely should not oppose that individual’s release. If the
prosecutor is persuaded to a higher degree of certainty, active advocacy may be
appropriate, and if the prosecutor is persuaded to a lesser degree of certainty, the prosecutor
may be obligated to defend the conviction.
297
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h) (2013).
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has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which
the defendant was convicted. 298
While these suggested steps may be appropriate to avoid disciplinary action, the
presence of “clear and convincing evidence” actually dictates a more robust
response for prosecutors committed to serving justice.
Setting a higher standard for active prosecutorial support is appropriate both
from normative and efficiency perspectives. Normatively speaking, the prosecutor
acts as an official representative of the U.S. government. The United States
Supreme Court explained in Berger v. United States: 299
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. 300
In other words, the actions of a prosecutor carry with them the imprimatur of the
sovereign—which is one reason prosecutors are so powerful in the postconviction
context. By actively seeking the release of a convicted individual, by joining a
motion with the defense as the government did with Haynesworth and Odom, the
government is sending the message—as it expressly did in those cases—that those
individuals are actually innocent. 301 That mea culpa on the part of the government
is not warranted where an individual is “probably innocent” or there is a
“reasonable likelihood” of innocence.
Employing a “clear and convincing” standard for active government support
is important also from an efficiency and cost perspective. First, given the official
mea culpa that attends a joint motion with the government, such motions
ultimately may form the basis for a petition for wrongful incarceration
compensation. Given the significance of the payout that can result, prosecutors
should be convinced of an individual’s innocence prior to officially acknowledging
such innocence. Second, affirmative support of a petition requires an expenditure
of time on the part of the prosecutor’s office—far more so than nonopposition to
an actual innocence or habeas petition would—and an expenditure of political and
public capital.
Applying a “probable” innocence standard would likely mean that some
portion of the time prosecutors will be expending government resources to free an
individual who is guilty. Advocating for such individuals on the basis of just over
50% certainty may cause division within a prosecutor’s office, potentially
298
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See also Medwed, supra note 5, at 1559 (“Exonerations may also result from
prosecutors joining in a defense request to free the inmate prior to a fullfledged evidentiary
hearing or opting not to retry a defendant . . . .”).
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generating resentment toward the postconviction review process and skepticism
toward the concept of “wrongful conviction.” Pitching innocence to a governor’s
office where prosecutors have no “clear and convincing evidence” at which to
point may also reduce the prosecutors’ credibility with the governor’s office,
where typically a very high standard for innocence is required. 302 Finally,
exonerating the “probably innocent” may sacrifice the public’s trust in the criminal
justice system. Where prosecutors are not completely convinced, the public also is
not likely to be completely convinced, and therefore applying supporting
innocence on the basis of “probability” may engender public distrust in the
criminal justice system. In addition, where prosecutors are not clearly convinced of
innocence, they risk being held personally responsible for freeing criminals who
may ultimately commit further crime. Indeed, in hotly contested district attorney
elections, any question regarding the certainty of someone’s innocence prior to
exoneration can become a campaign issue. 303 Not only is this potential outcome
problematic in terms of public safety, but it also risks triggering public backlash
against the exoneration movement, a move clearly counterproductive to justice.
IV. THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS OF RESOLVING THE NEW PROSECUTOR’S
DILEMMA
Of course, as with any proposal, the structural modifications and the concept
of tiered review will not eliminate entirely the problem they address. Nor is
perfection the criterion required to assess the proposal’s utility. That said, an open
question remains regarding whether prosecutors’ offices are likely to adopt a tiered
innocence analysis framework, particularly in the absence of a model rule that sets
disciplinary consequences for failing to meet a certain standard of postconviction
conduct.
While there may be a will to adopt postconviction review procedures in large
cities with liberal district attorneys, like Manhattan and Dallas, one might wonder
whether implementing postconviction review is a realistic possibility in those
jurisdictions where adversarial culture is most entrenched and where skepticism
toward innocence claims is at its highest. These are the offices where wrongful
conviction is most likely and where exoneration is most difficult. 304 For those
offices where allegations of actual innocence are viewed most skeptically, where
prosecutors are most adamant that current office practices are sufficient to ensure
that wrongful convictions do not occur, 305 and where aggressive prosecutorial
302

Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 485–87.
See, e.g., Jennifer Emily, Attorneys Who Oppose Craig Watkins’ Re-Election as
Dallas County District Attorney Fault Actions of His Conviction Integrity Unit, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Nov. 30, 2010, 12:06 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/loc
al-politics/20101025-Attorneys-who-oppose-Craig-Watkins-688.ece.
304
GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at 32–33.
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See, e.g., Foon Rhee, Commentary: How Innocent People Land in Prison,
MCCLATCHY DC (June 12, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/06/12/151901/comm
entary-how-innocent-people.html (citing one district attorney who explained that she did
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culture is so entrenched that a sea change toward a “minister of justice” mentality
seems most impossible, 306 an embarrassing high-profile wrongful conviction may
be most likely. These types of incidents have in some instances created dramatic
pressure for reform, even in districts previously adamant about the frivolousness of
postconviction review, and they may be sufficient to force prosecutors to embrace
a postconviction review system. For other prosecutors’ offices, an evolution
toward adopting a postconviction review framework is likely to be more gradual.
But either way, the widespread adoption of postconviction review procedures is
not only realistic, but the politics of wrongful conviction are pushing prosecutors
in that direction, some swiftly and others gradually.
A. The Case for Dramatic Near-Future Reform
Almost all of the conviction integrity units discussed above were formed in
the wake of a public crisis of confidence in the district attorney’s office. In Dallas
County and Cook County, a series of embarrassing public exonerations galvanized
public attention to the need for postconviction reform, essentially requiring a
dramatic sea change in how prosecutors review and respond to postconviction
claims of innocence. 307 Indeed, conviction integrity has become a hot topic in
district attorney elections across the country, and a particularly popular campaign
promise in counties that have experienced one or more high-profile exonerations in
recent history. 308 Brooklyn DA Kenneth Thompson vowed to resolve an alleged
crisis of wrongful convictions during his campaign. 309
In Lake County, Illinois, the 2012 Democratic candidate for state attorney
made his proposed conviction integrity unit the centerpiece of his campaign. 310 In
some elections, like that which brought Dallas County’s Craig Watkins to office,
not need a formal conviction integrity unit because “[m]y whole office is an integrity
unit”).
306
See, e.g., Graczyk, supra note 81 (discussing the legacy of Henry Wade, Dallas
County district attorney for thirty-six years, which in recent years has included nineteen
proven wrongful convictions and significant allegations of prosecutorial misconduct).
Some claimed Wade’s office had a “cowboy kind of mentality,” though his son disputed
the characterization, explaining that Wade was simply “very competitive.” Id.
307
See supra Parts II.A.1, 5.
308
See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Cynic, Optimist Examine Alvarez’ New Philosophy, CHICAGO
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/20
12/02/alvarez-to-partner-with-advocates.html (connecting Cook County District Attorney
Alvarez’s recent adoption of a conviction integrity unit with media attention for failure to
reexamine a 2004 case, a dozen exonerations that have occurred since she took office in
2008, and the fact that she is currently running for reelection).
309
Oren Yaniv, Brooklyn DA Kenneth Thompson Off to Slow Start at Fixing Wrongful
Convictions, NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyccrime/b-klyn-da-thompson-slow-fix-wrongful-convictions-critics-article-1.1747848.
310
See Chris Kennedy, Lake County State’s Attorney, ABC EYEWITNESS NEWS, http://
abclocal.go.com/wls/feature?section=news/politics/local_elections&id=8800657 (last visited May 12, 2014).
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public outrage surrounding a high-profile wrongful conviction has been decisive,
paving the way for a dramatic shift in administration and office culture, even in
traditionally conservative, adversarial prosecutor’s offices. 311
Craig Watkins won the election in Dallas County in 2007 after the county
faced a series of embarrassing public exonerations. Although Dallas County had
long been a conservative, tough-on-crime district, and Watkins was a defense
attorney with no prosecutorial experience, he was elected on a platform of
restoring public trust in the criminal justice system, the promise of improved
conviction integrity a central tenet of his campaign. 312 Dallas County had elected
conservative, highly aggressive prosecutors for years, but the very public wrongful
conviction problems of the county swept Watkins into office and resulted in a
complete cultural change of that office. 313 Watkins’s experience demonstrates that
even in jurisdictions with an entrenched adversarial culture—where there is a focus
on “winning” rather than “administering justice” 314—a tidal wave of public
opinion can effect cultural transformation. And the public often demands this type
of transformation in the wake of particularly egregious instances of wrongful
conviction, as seen in Dallas County in 2007 and more recently in Williamson
County, another Texas county still reeling from a high-profile exoneration
vigorously resisted by the district attorney. 315
311

See, e.g., Brandi Grissom, Morton Case Is Focus of Williamson County DA Race,
TEX. TRIB. (May 16, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-dept-criminal-justice/micha
el-morton/michael-morton-case-central-heated-wilco-da-race/ (discussing the prominence
of Michael Morton’s exoneration in the Williamson County district attorney election);
supra Part II.A.; supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Dallas’s history of
wrongful convictions prior to Craig Watkins’s election victory).
312
See EDWARD GRAY, HENRY WADE’S TOUGH JUSTICE: HOW DALLAS COUNTY
PROSECUTORS LED THE NATION IN CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 16 (2010) (detailing the nomercy justice distributed by legendary Texas prosecutor Henry Wade and his pre-Watkins
successors); Buntin, supra note 54.
313
Radley Balko, Is This America’s Best Prosecutor?, REASON.COM (Apr. 7, 2008),
http://reason.com/archives/2008/04/07/is-this-americas-best-prosecut (noting the firing of
nine top-level prosecutors); Graczyk, supra note 81. Immediately upon taking office,
Watkins removed prosecutors from the previous administration who were perceived to lack
Watkins’s commitment to reforming office practices, while others left voluntarily. Wilson
Interview, supra note 59.
314
Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2010). For example, “even the best of the prosecutors—
young, idealistic, energetic, dedicated to the interests of justice—are easily caught up in the
hunt mentality of an aggressive office.” H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The
Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1702 (2000).
315
John Bradley, the district attorney of Williamson County, Texas, recently lost his
bid for reelection due to his prominent role in resisting the innocence claim of Michael
Morton, a man convicted in 1987 of murdering his wife and whom DNA evidence
exonerated in 2010. See Grissom, supra note 311. Bradley was not district attorney at the
time of the conviction but resisted for years Morton’s request for access to his case file and
DNA testing, thereby extending Morton’s stay in prison and allowing the real killer (who
had subsequently committed another murder) several more years of freedom. See id.;
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Regardless of whether it occurs in a red or blue state, wrongful conviction
tends to evoke a visceral, “this-could-happen-to-me” response that bridges
traditional political and social divides.316 As Professor Abbe Smith observed, “at
least in principle, protecting the innocent is one of the few things in the criminal
justice system that everyone can agree on—the left and the right, defense lawyers
and prosecutors, police and the public.” 317 In the wrongful conviction context, the
public is not only united by an innate sense of injustice, but by the reality that the
prosecution’s error also allowed the perpetrator of a heinous crime to go free. 318 In
a country where the criminal justice system relies largely on elected prosecutors,
the increasing incidences of public exonerations—and the public outrage that
accompanies them—has triggered a dramatic change in various jurisdictions across
the nation and promises to ensure that an increasing number of prosecutors’ offices
will adopt postconviction review regimes.
B. An Eventual but Inevitable Tipping Point: The Case for Gradual Adoption of
Systematized Postconviction Review
Not every prosecutor’s office will encounter an embarrassing exoneration or
become enmeshed in an election where conviction integrity is the central issue, but
a gradual nationwide shift toward systematized postconviction review seems likely
nevertheless. The prevalence of DNA testing statutes and innocence statutes
ensures that prosecutors will continue to have to grapple with postconviction
claims of innocence. 319 As courts increasingly allow habeas petitioners to
circumvent procedural defaults in the habeas context where a credible case for
innocence has been made, 320 more habeas petitioners will claim innocence, and
Goodwyn, supra note 286. Morton’s conviction was featured prominently in the campaign
in which Bradley sought reelection. For example, mixed in with other election signs along
Williamson County roads were signs with red bandanas tied at the corners, which read,
“Remember Michael Morton Vote No to John Bradley”; the jury foreman from Morton’s
trial recorded a campaign ad for Bradley’s opponent, referencing the case; and the family
of the woman murdered by the real killer while he was still at large were actively involved
in campaigning for Bradley’s opponent. Grissom, supra note 311.
316
See Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s
Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 321
(2010).
317
Id.
318
In Dallas County alone, the Conviction Integrity Unit’s efforts between 2007 and
2012 have identified ten previously unknown actual perpetrators over the course of
exonerating the convicted innocent. Ware, supra note 20, at 1041.
319
See generally Garrett, supra note 263; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008).
320
Although federal courts have not recognized a federal freestanding actual
innocence claim, a colorable claim of actual innocence may toll habeas statutes of
limitation that otherwise have passed, remove the bar to a successive habeas petition, or
impact the court’s analysis of prejudice. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 560 U.S. 390, 440−41
(1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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prosecutors will continue to face pressure to review and respond to these claims.
And, of course, the number of DNA exonerations continues to rise, as the
Innocence Project makes its way through a cache of preserved DNA evidence from
Virginia crime labs, 321 as Dallas County works its way through its own DNA
stockpile, 322 and as the Colorado Attorney General Office’s Justice Review Project
uses federal funding to review thousands of Colorado convictions in search of
cases that could benefit from modern DNA testing. 323 These DNA cases continue
to focus the public’s attention on the need for postconviction review, and they will
continue to punish those prosecutors who have no standardized protocol and no
office procedure for dealing with innocence claims.
At some point, the stockpile of conclusive DNA exonerations will be
exhausted, and defense lawyers and conviction-integrity-minded prosecutors will
be left with only the murkier, more debatable, inherently inconclusive cases of
innocence—but this eventuality only makes adoption of a standardized protocol
more important. Non-DNA cases often do not evoke the visceral public response
that DNA cases do because there is more likely to be a lack of consensus regarding
guilt or innocence. 324 For those prosecutors disinclined to reconsider closed
convictions, non-DNA cases pose little threat of public embarrassment, even if the
prosecutor responds to that claim in a way that is reflexive and unstudied. In other
words, the abundance of non-DNA cases—the vast majority of the exoneration
cases that remain undiscovered325—threatens to derail the steady progress toward
standardized postconviction review that has been achieved over the past ten years.
At the same time, these non-DNA cases, because they are far murkier and less
conclusive than DNA cases, are just the type of case for which the review
framework proposed above would be most useful, because these are the cases
where a prosecutor is most likely to struggle to determine whether further
investigation or supporting a petition is warranted.
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See Frank Green, Va. DNA Data Support Innocence of 33 Convicted of Sex
Crimes, Study Concludes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (June 18, 2012, 1:21 PM), http://
www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2012/jun/18/va-dna-data-supports-innocence-of-33-convict
ed-of--ar-1996030/ (stating that Urban Institute study documents thirty-three individuals
for whom DNA evidence indicates their innocence and that “more people remain to be
cleared by the Virginia project”).
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See Scott Horton, In Texas, 41 Exonerations from DNA Evidence in 9 Years,
HARPER’S (Jan. 5, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://harpers.org/archive/2011/01/hbc-90007895
(noting that although at one point it appeared Dallas had nearly exhausted its review of its
DNA stockpile for exonerations, the county’s crime lab then discovered a new cache of
DNA evidence to test).
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See Associated Press, Man Convicted in Colorado Freed by DNA Evidence,
BOSTON.COM (May 1, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/vermont/articles/2012/05/
01/man_convicted_in_colorado_freed_by_dna_evidence/.
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See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1161−62 (2011).
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See GARRETT, supra note 19, at 11−13, 271; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 5, at
10.
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Regardless of what lies ahead in terms of DNA cases, the legal academy and
the innocence movement have initiated a debate on prosecutorial postconviction
ethics that is unlikely to abate even when DNA cases taper off. The debate over
prosecutorial postconviction ethics initiated by Professor Fred Zacharias in 2005 326
has become a talking point for crusading district attorneys like Cyrus Vance and
Craig Watkins. 327 These prosecutors are active in their efforts to ensure that the
issue remains on the public radar and is a topic of conversation at prosecutorial
conferences and in the media. 328
Finally, the spread of innocence projects to law schools across the country
ensures that postconviction justice will be part of the ethic of the next generation of
prosecutors in this country. While law school innocence projects are not without
their critics, 329 they teach students the qualities of “thoroughness and skepticism,”
with the skepticism being directed toward fallible forensics and the occasionally
dysfunctional criminal justice system. 330 Innocence projects are more likely to
draw future prosecutors than traditional criminal defense clinics, because
innocence project participants can avoid the moral choice of whether they are
willing to represent the actually guilty331 (a choice the prosecutorially inclined may
be less willing to make). And for those future prosecutors not directly involved in
on-campus innocence projects, the existence of these clinical programs ensures
they have contact with fellow students who are involved and that they hear about
the high-profile exonerations in which these innocence projects occasionally are
involved. 332 Innocence projects across law school campuses are raising awareness
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See generally Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 46−73; Zacharias, supra
note 13, at 173−76 (discussing a prosecutors’ ethical duty to serve justice after a
conviction); Luban, supra note 13, at 16−17 (proposing expectations for prosecutors when
new evidence suggests a convicted person may be innocent); Medwed, supra note 8
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fuller realization of the minister-of-justice ideal for prosecutors in the postconviction
process).
327
See, e.g., Vance, Jr., supra note 107.
328
See, e.g., INTEGRITY PROJECT REPORT, supra note 20 (incorporating findings of the
2011 conviction integrity conference attended by various conviction integrity unit
directors, academics, and others); Buntin, supra note 54; Vance, Jr., supra note 107.
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Proven Innocent, supra note 223; see also Know the Cases: Clarence Harrison,
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of wrongful conviction among the next generation of prosecutors and decreasing
reflexive skepticism toward actual innocence claims. Whether the current
generation of prosecutors comes to recognize the merits of systematizing
postconviction review or not, the work of campus innocence projects is increasing
the likelihood that postconviction review will be an important reality for the next
generation.
The dedicated advocacy of district attorneys like Vance and Watkins and the
growing popularity of the innocence movement among the next generation of
prosecutors ensure a gradual but steady evolution toward widespread adoption of
systematized postconviction review.
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of DNA exonerations has triggered an explosion of postconviction
innocence claims, one to which prosecutors across the country generally have been
slow to respond. Although the reality of wrongful conviction is widely understood,
most prosecutors operate from a default position of resistance to innocence claims,
in large part because the overwhelming majority of these claims are, in fact,
frivolous. And while prosecutors, as “ministers of justice,” are ethically obligated
to remedy wrongful convictions, the vast majority of states lack ethical guidelines
that mandate prosecutors do so and assist them in determining how best to do so.
As a result, prosecutors across the country face a new dilemma: how to honor the
prosecutor’s commitment to serving justice by identifying the convicted innocent,
without wasting precious resources investigating largely frivolous petitions.
This Article attempts to help prosecutors resolve that dilemma, proposing
structural modifications to prosecutors’ offices and a concept of tiered review, or a
standardized postconviction review regime that balances prosecutors’ ethical duties
with the budgetary limitations prosecutors face. Drawing upon the experiences of
five conviction integrity units, the Article identifies three key components that can
be applied by any prosecutors’ office interested in postconviction review. It also
identifies and remedies a notable deficiency in these conviction integrity units: the
utter lack of any type of concrete review standard to be applied when engaging in
the process of review. The proposal suggests clear standards of review to be used
at each stage in the postconviction review process, calibrated to serve justice—as
prosecutors are obligated to do—while respecting the budgetary constraints
prosecutors face. Use of such standards is essential for ensuring consistency and
accuracy in the review process and avoiding racial or socioeconomic
discrimination.
High-profile public exonerations have drawn attention to the problem of
postconviction review and indeed have inspired institution of the conviction
integrity units catalogued above. While some might query whether widespread
adoption of a standardized postconviction review framework is realistic, the rise in
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Clarence_Harrison.php
(last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
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public exonerations and the increased attention prosecutors are devoting to this
problem demonstrate how practical this type of review is. Making such review
standard practice across the country promises to make a difference not just in
minimizing wrongful convictions and facilitating appropriate exonerations, but
doing so also has the potential to strengthen prosecutorial efficiency and
effectiveness, improve the consistency of justice the accused in this country
receive (reducing the incidence of racial and socioeconomic discrimination), and
point prosecutors back toward their traditional role as ministers of justice.

